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IT IS NOT WORKING: EXAMINING AN EMPLOYMENT LAW
MODEL FOR DETERMINING INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY IN
CASES OF SEXUAL ASSAULT BY STUDENT-ATHLETES1
“Their apathy, their lack of apology I could live with, but what
troubled me most was their failure to ask the single most important
question: How do we ensure this does not happen again?”2
I. CHALLENGING THE RULING ON THE FIELD: AN INTRODUCTION
TO INSTITUTIONAL AND STUDENT-ATHLETE LIABILITY
Male student-athletes represent less than five percent on aver-
age of the university student body, but contribute to seventy-seven
percent more known incidents of sexual coercion than other mem-
bers of the male student population.3  Due to the high-profile status
of university athletic programs, frequent press coverage can make it
seem as though every semester there is a new case of student-athlete
sexual assault, followed by an ineffective investigation that fails to
hold either the student or the school sufficiently responsible.4  The
latter of these inadequacies is the subject of this Comment, which
asks why the universities and athletic departments that recruit,
train, protect, and defend perpetrator-athletes seemingly cannot be
held legally accountable for their roles in allowing campus sexual
1. While this Comment suggests a model for Title IX sexual assault
adjudication based on Title VII jurisprudence in cases where the accused students
are high-profile athletes, it does not take a stance on the emerging issue of
whether student-athletes are in fact employees of their respective institutions
under the Fair Labor Standards Act for purposes of minimum wage or worker’s
compensation entitlement.  For further discussion of the employment status of
student-athletes, see generally Geoffrey J. Rosenthal, College Play and the FLSA: Why
Student-Athletes Should Be Classified as “Employees” Under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
35 HOFSTRA LAB. & AMP. L.J. 133 (2018); Justin C. Vine, Leveling the Playing Field:
Student Athletes Are Employees of Their University, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS
J. 235 (2014).  For an overview of recent judicial developments, see infra notes
16–17 and accompanying text.
2. See Chanel Miller, Know My Name, 301 (2019) (referring to Stanford Uni-
versity’s response to student-athlete Brock Turner’s assault of Chanel Miller).
3. See Belinda-Rose Young, et al., Sexual Coercion Practices Among Undergraduate
Male Recreational Athletes, Intercollegiate Athletes, and Non-Athletes, 23 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 795, 804 (2017) (describing disproportionate representation of
student-athletes among college students named in sexual assault complaints).
4. See Kristy L. McCray et al., Creating Change in Intercollegiate Athletics: The Sex-
ual Assault Prevention Paradigm for Athletic Departments, 1 J. HIGHER ED. ATHLETICS &
INNOVATION 25, 28 (2018) (summarizing numerous highly publicized incidences
of student-athlete violence against women over past decade).
(329)
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assault to occur.5  In light of recent conversation challenging the
legitimacy of student-athletes’ amateur status, it is worth examining
potential applications of employment law liability standards to the
arena of high-revenue college athletics.6
Coaches and commentators alike have discussed the apparent
inevitability of compensation for high-profile players.7  Recently,
the NCAA has been making small concessions toward allowing uni-
versity athletes to profit from their labor.8  In March 2019, the Asso-
ciation was obliged to accept a California court’s ruling that it
cannot cap education-related scholarship packages for student-ath-
letes.9  This followed on the heels of another decision, which held
that the NCAA could not enforce rules prohibiting member schools
5. See Lisa Wade, Rape on Campus: Athletes, Status, and the Sexual Assault Crisis,
CONVERSATION (March 6, 2017, 10:14 PM) http://theconversation.com/rape-on-
campus-athletes-status-and-the-sexual-assault-crisis-72255 [https://perma.cc/926B-
G8SU] (listing specific instances of inadequate university response to sexual as-
sault by student-athletes and suggesting “perverse incentive” causes universities to
protect athletes for sake of profit).  For a further discussion of Title IX’s failures in
resolving issues of sexual assault, see infra notes 125–180 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Hillary Hunter, Strike Three: Calling Out College Officials for Sexual
Assault on Campus, 50 TEX. TECH L. REV. 277 (2018) (analyzing relationship be-
tween student-athletes’ heightened status on campus and insufficient liability stan-
dard under current Title IX interpretation).  For a further discussion of how
courts could apply Title VII as a model for interpreting Title IX sexual assault, see
infra notes 194–208 and accompanying text (proposing employment-law standard
of liability for universities in student-athlete assault cases, similar to Title VII as
applied to coworker sexual harassment).
7. See, e.g., Travis Waldron, The NCAA is Losing its Fight to Keep Exploiting College
Athletes, HUFFPOST (updated Apr. 9, 2019) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ncaa-
pay-college-athletes-final-four_n_5ca61cb9e4b082d775e1d201 [https://perma.cc/
6G7Q-WEKT] (reviewing proposals by lawmakers advocating increased compensa-
tion for college players); see also Dan Murphy, UConn’s Edsall: Paying College Players
‘Inevitable’, ESPN (Aug 5. 2019) https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/
id/27328761/uconn-edsall-paying-college-players-inevitable [https://perma.cc/
97BA-WVNR] (expressing college football coach’s opinion that NCAA football is
no longer an amateur sport).  These statements are a few among many in a grow-
ing discourse surrounding the professionalization, and exploitation, inherent in
the current college sports model. See Maria Koran, Game Changer: Inside the Fight to
End Exploitation of Athletes at US Colleges, GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2019) https://
www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/oct/04/ncaa-california-law-pay-student-ath-
letes-colleges [https://perma.cc/SD5E-J3WM] (expressing widespread nature of
efforts to allow students to receive payment in relation to athletic performance).
8. See Waldron, supra note 7 (noting challenges to NCAA’s amateurism
model).
9. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (holding NCAA rules capping educa-
tion-related compensation for student athletes unreasonably restrained trade in
violation of the Sherman Act).  The court emphasized the “great disparity between
the extraordinary revenue that Defendants garner from Division I basketball and
FBS football, and the modest benefits that class members receive in exchange for
their participation in these sports relative to the value of their athletic services and
the contributions they make.” See id. at 1110 (concluding sacrifices student-ath-
2
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from allowing players to profit from the sale and use of their
names, images, and likenesses.10  After a decade of stubborn re-
fusal, the NCAA responded by establishing a working group to con-
sider changing its rules as to the compensation of student-athletes
for the use of their names, images, and likenesses (hereinafter,
“NIL”).11  Soon thereafter, California passed a law allowing in-state
college athletes to receive NIL compensation, which the NCAA op-
posed despite its apparent open-mindedness toward the issue.12
Still, a push for legislation enabling student-athlete endorsements
gained national support.13  In late October 2019, the NCAA Board
of Governors voted unanimously to allow student-athletes to profit
from NIL endorsements.14
letes make should be rewarded and NCAA’s cap on education-related rewards con-
stituted anticompetitive trade restraint).
10. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 739 Fed. Appx. 890, 892
(9th Cir. 2018) (holding NCAA can no longer prevent schools from capping play-
ers’ educational benefits); see also Washington Bytes, Fair Pay to Play and Video-Game
Likeness: Revisiting the NCAA’s Restrictions on Athlete Compensation, FORBES (May 1,
2019, 9;40 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2019/05/01/fair-
pay-to-play-and-video-game-likeness-revisiting-the-ncaas-restrictions-on-athlete-com-
pensation/#765d1e8979fa [https://perma.cc/42BM-RT37] (analyzing current sta-
tus and potential repercussions of NCAA’s moves toward allowing players to profit
from their names, images, and likenesses).
11. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Working Group to Examine Name, Image
and Likeness, NCAA (May 14, 2019, 2:40 PM)  http://www.ncaa.org/about/re-
sources/media-center/news/ncaa-working-group-examine-name-image-and-like-
ness [https://perma.cc/7GVY-6QUW] (reporting NCAA’s intent to look into NIL
compensation issues raised in proposed legislation); see also generally Jill Martin,
NCAA to Consider Allowing Athletes to Profit from Names, Image and Likeness, CNN (up-
dated May 15, 2019, 9:15 AM) https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/15/sport/ncaa-
working-group-to-examine-name-image-and-likeness-spt-intl/index.html [https://
perma.cc/F7XR-VRXM] (describing scope and structure of NCAA working group
examining potential regulatory reform in reaction to court and legislative action).
12. See Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, One Step Closer to Pay for California College Athletes,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 11, 2019) https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/
09/11/california-passes-bill-allowing-athletes-be-paid-name-image-and-likeness
[https://perma.cc/3PH2-6WQV] (announcing approval of bill that would allow
college athletes to profit from endorsements using name, image, and likeness, and
stating NCAA “fiercely opposed” California bill).
13. See Greta Anderson, The Push for Player Pay Goes National, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Oct. 4, 2019) https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/10/04/us-congress-
man-propose-college-athlete-payment-bill [https://perma.cc/X59R-ZEAV] (re-
porting plans for federal NIL compensation bill).  Because of the interstate nature
of college athletics, a national law would be a more serious threat to the NCAA’s
amateurism rules than state-by-state legislation. See id. (suggesting single federal
law would circumvent interstate commerce clause constitutionality argument
raised by piecemeal state legislation).
14. See Steve Almsay et al., NCAA Says Athletes May Profit from Name, Image and
Likeness, CNN (October 29, 2019, 5:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/29/
us/ncaa-athletes-compensation/index.html [https://perma.cc/ED68-WBVG] (re-
porting NCAA’s reversal of position after California passed Fair Pay to Play Act).
The NCAA’s board decision will go into effect in 2021, by which point each of the
3
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Alongside the ongoing fight for flexibility in NCAA regulation,
a battle over compensation is occurring to a lesser extent between
athletes and schools themselves.15  In August 2019, the Ninth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals affirmed an April 2017 decision from the
Northern District of California that held student-athletes are not
entitled to compensation by either the NCAA or their amateur ath-
letic conference.16  The reasoning behind this recent decision, how-
ever, leaves open the question of whether student athletes can be
considered employees of their respective universities.17  In Septem-
ber 2019, a New York State Senator proposed a bill that would go
beyond allowing NIL compensation by outside entities, requiring
universities in the state to compensate student-athletes directly.18  If
major “amateur” athletics programs’ amateur status is finally on the
table for discussion, it does not seem out of the question to con-
sider reforming some of the other injustices playing out off the
field, including the disproportionate number of sexual assaults
committed by elite athletes.19
This Comment proposes an incentive for universities to accept
increased accountability for the actions of their most treasured stu-
dents by recognizing the employment-like relationship between
elite student-athletes and the institutions for which they play.20  Ti-
three NCAA divisions is expected to create rules to govern NIL opportunities. See
id. (stating January 2021 as deadline).
15. For a further discussion of the ongoing debate regarding student-athlete
“amateur” status, see infra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
16. See generally Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905 (9th
Cir. 2019) (reasoning that Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) football play-
ers are not employees of either NCAA or PAC-12 Conference according to Fair
Labor Standards Act and California labor law).
17. See id. at 907 (declining to address employment relationship between stu-
dent-athletes and their universities); see also Christine Colwell, Playing for Pay or
Playing to Play: Student-Athletes as Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 79 LA.
L. REV. 900, 925–32 (2019) (suggesting many reasons given for students not being
employed by NCAA or Conference could apply in positive to university).
18. See Joseph Nardone, New York Senator Proposes Bill to Have College Athletes
Paid Directly by Schools, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2019, 4:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/josephnardone/2019/09/18/new-york-senator-proposes-bill-to-have-college-
athletes-paid-directly-by-schools/#632bd3df4d17 [https://perma.cc/8FEZ-VS52]
(describing bill proposed by State Senator Kevin Parker, which would give athletes
NIL rights and require athletic departments to share percentage of annual reve-
nues with student-athletes).
19. See Belinda-Rose Young, et al., supra note 3, at 804 (finding male college
athletes seventy-seven percent more likely than other male students to use sexual
coercion, including violence).
20. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 6, at 279–81 (explaining extent of oversight
administrators have over elite student-athletes, who hold elevated social status in
relation to non-athlete peers).  Administrators and athletic departments have
more control over the selection, training, and activities of student-athletes than of
other students. See id. at 281 (explaining why heightened level of institutional re-
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tle IX should be able to follow a Title VII model of vicarious liability
in analyzing sexual assault cases naming college athletes as perpe-
trators because of the unique relationship between high-revenue
sports participants and their universities.21  Using a Title VII stan-
dard of vicarious liability, even on a case-by-case basis, will raise the
stakes for university athletic programs in the Title IX sexual assault
context, likely leading to improved institutional deterrence and
prevention measures.22  Universities and their students alike would
be better served by policies that recognize the impact high-profile
athletes’ social status has on their power and influence—for better
or worse—over their peers.23
II.  RULES OF THE GAME: BACKGROUND
Despite some recent pushes to change their designation, all
student-athletes are currently classified as students, rather than em-
ployees of their respective institutions.24  As such, athletes and all
students of educational institutions are governed by Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”).25  It is important to
note that, even if athletes were considered employees, their con-
duct and the institution’s role in a sexual assault case would be ana-
lyzed according to Title IX, which applies to discrimination claims
naming teachers and other employees as well as students.26  This
sponsibility should apply where the perpetrator of sexual assault is a high-profile
athlete).  For a further discussion of how a vicarious liability standard akin to Title
VII would lead to safer campuses more in line with goals of gender equality origi-
nally set forth in Title IX that have not yet been realized, see infra notes 252–253
and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Colwell, supra note 17, at 925–32 (applying multi-factor test to
determine student-athletes are analogous to employees of university).  For a fur-
ther discussion of the connection between universities’ control over student-ath-
letes and the appropriateness of institutional sexual assault liability models under
Title IX and Title VII, see infra notes 203–222 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the incentives created by stricter vicarious lia-
bility under Title IX, see infra notes 225–253 and accompanying text.
23. See generally Hunter, supra note 6 (discussing effect of campus social hier-
archy on reporting and enforcing Title IX violations).
24. See Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905, 907 (9th Cir.
2019) (leaving question of football player’s employment relationship to university
“if at all, for another day”).
25. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2020) (prohibiting educational discrimination
on basis of sex).
26. See Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment
of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, DEP’T OF EDUC., https:/
/www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html [https://perma.cc/
84E3-GFLH] (last updated Jan. 10, 2020) (“Sexual harassment of a student by a
teacher or other school employee can be discrimination in violation of Title IX.”
(citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998))).
5
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Comment, rather than proposing a radical shift to employee desig-
nation for all student-athletes, suggests establishing a more flexible
interpretation of Title IX that would allow courts to use Title VII as
a model in cases where the relationship between the student-assail-
ant and the institution reflects more control than a university has
over the general student body.27
A. Title IX Liability
Title IX was enacted to ensure all students are protected
equally.28  While the law has been effective as far as encouraging
female participation in athletics and preventing discrimination in
academic opportunities, it has fallen short when it comes to pro-
tecting students from each other.29  Sex discrimination prohibited
under Title IX includes sexual violence and coercion, as a univer-
sity’s tolerance of those offenses can create a campus environment
inconsistent with the statute’s promise of equality.30  The law’s en-
forcement power is ostensibly based on the risk of schools losing
federal funding if they are not compliant.31  However, this has
27. For a further discussion of how and why the Title VII standard would be
an appropriate analog for Title IX analysis, see infra notes 194–208 and accompa-
nying text.
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1972) (“No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance. . . .”).  Almost all public and private universities fall
under the purview of Title IX because their students are eligible to receive federal
financial aid. See Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/inclusion/title-ix-frequently-asked-questions#who [https://
perma.cc/86YE-WTXR] (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) (explaining any institution
whose students benefit from federal financial aid programs is subject to Title IX
regulation).
29. See Dawn E. Ellison, Sexual Harassment in Education: A Review of Standards
for Institutional Liability Under Title IX, 75 N.C.L. REV. 2049, 2146 (Sept. 1997)
(“Peer sexual harassment can have a significant effect on a student’s access to edu-
cational opportunity.  If Title IX is to be effective in guaranteeing equal educa-
tional opportunity to students regardless of their sex, the law must offer a viable
remedy to students who are deprived of that equal opportunity when they are vic-
timized by peer sexual harassment.”); see also Hunter, supra note 23 at 286 (discuss-
ing Title IX’s relative levels of success, and lack thereof, in increasing
opportunities for women and addressing sexual violence, respectively).  Hunter
cites the heavy burden on plaintiffs under current interpretation of Title IX as a
reason for its failure to hold universities liable and effect meaningful prevention.
Id. (noting plaintiffs have rarely met burden for institutional liability).
30. See generally Office for Civil Rights, supra note 26 (updating guidance on
sexual harassment policy under Title IX to reflect private rights of students).
31. See Title IX, KNOW YOUR IX, https://www.knowyourix.org/college-re-
sources/title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/YU9U-94T4] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020) (ex-
plaining universities risk their federal funding by failing to remedy educational
environments in violation of Title IX).
6
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never occurred, and schools are able to escape material conse-
quences so long as they promise to change the offending policies
after a Title IX investigation.32
Due to Supreme Court interpretation of Title IX from 1979,
students have a right to private suit against their schools for peer-
on-peer sexual harassment.33   The newfound applicability of Title
IX sexual assault liability to institutions encouraged vigilance by
schools in fear of litigation for almost twenty years, until a pair of
Supreme Court cases in the late 1990s invented the “deliberate in-
difference” standard that courts apply to this day.34  The test, first
articulated in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,35 a case
of teacher-student sexual harassment, requires that a school have
“actual notice” and react with “deliberate indifference” to a known
risk of severe and pervasive sexually harassing behavior.36  The
Court applied the same test a year later to a case of student-student
harassment in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.37  Since
then, “deliberate indifference” has been a difficult standard to meet
for plaintiffs who have been sexually harassed by another student or
by a school employee.38  A significant portion of cases brought
against schools for sexual assault under Title IX have been dis-
missed on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss for failure to
satisfy the prongs of actual notice and deliberate indifference.39
32. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability
for Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 Yale L.J. 2038, 2061 n.102 (2016) (noting,
although between eighty and ninety percent of applicable schools are not compli-
ant with Title IX, none have yet lost federal funding).
33. See MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 2061–62 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.,
441 U.S. 677, 677–79 (1979) (creating private right of action for students against
schools under Title IX)).
34. See id. at 2063–64 (describing outcomes of Gebser v. Lago Vista, 524 U.S.
274, 292 (1998), which established the “deliberate indifference” standard in the
context of teacher-student harassment, and Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
526 U.S. 629 (1999), which applied the standard to student-student sexual harass-
ment); see also Ellison, supra note 29, at 2143–45 (explaining that circuit courts
applied Title VII standard of institutional liability to peer sexual harassment under
Title IX before the Gebser case mandated deliberate indifference standard).
35. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
36. See id. at 292 (asserting Congress’s intent was for Title IX to require actual
notice and deliberate indifference).
37. See Davis, 526 U.S. 629 (extending deliberate indifference test to student-
on-student sexual harassment).
38. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vi-
carious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS.
J. 755, 777 (1999) (criticizing Gebser rule as most stringent approach to vicarious
liability under major civil rights statutes).
39. See MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 2040 n.5 (reporting deliberate indiffer-
ence standard is often fatal at preliminary motion stage, and is main issue used by
victims’ representatives to decide whether to bring Title IX case).  MacKinnon’s
7
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In 2007, the standard for “actual notice” was broadened some-
what among federal circuit courts.40  Two cases that year, Williams v.
Board of Regents41 and Simpson v. University of Colorado,42  found pre-
existing notice of conduct or proclivities to suffice under the “delib-
erate indifference” framework.43  In Williams, female college stu-
dent Tiffany Williams filed a Title IX suit against the University of
Georgia after she was gang-raped by three of the university’s ath-
letes.44  Williams alleged the University knew the basketball player
who initiated the sexual assault had a history of sexual misconduct
when they recruited him, and subsequently failed to take necessary
precautions to protect female students from him.45  The Tenth Cir-
cuit held the University was “deliberately indifferent” to the risk of
harm posed by the student-athlete because it “knew of a need to . . .
supervise in a particular area and . . . made a deliberate choice not
to take any action.”46  The holding in Williams opened the door for
Title IX plaintiffs to argue universities and their athletic depart-
ments have sufficient notice to be held responsible where they
know of previous conduct by a student-athlete or recruit, even
research found that, in the first sixteen years following the Gebser decision, 176
cases analyzing the “deliberate indifference” standard of institutional liability for
sexual assault were dismissed on summary judgment or Rule 12 motion, while in
the same period, thirty-eight cases survived Rule 12 motions and 68 survived sum-
mary judgment motions (including some overlap from the aforementioned 38,
which were again challenged on summary judgment). See id.  MacKinnon has sig-
nificant litigation experience, including decades of involvement in sexual harass-
ment cases, which has supplemented her research to better inform her
understanding of the significance of the deliberate indifference test in deciding
cases on preliminary motions. See id.
40. See Grayson Sang Walker, The Evolution and Limits of Title IX Doctrine on Peer
Sexual Assault, 45 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS–CIV. LIB. L.R. 95, 100 (2010) (explaining
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretation of “actual notice”).
41. 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007).
42. 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
43. See MacKinnon, supra note 32 at 2075–76. (“In [Williams], the known risk
was specific to a perpetrator; in [Simpson], to a university-sponsored program.”).
44. See Williams, 477 F.3d at 1288–1890 (discussing details of Williams’s sexual
assault and university’s reaction to her allegations).
45. See id. at 1289–90 (explaining basketball player Tony Cole had previously
been dismissed from other colleges for incidents related to sexual harassment and
assault).  University of Georgia’s men’s basketball head coach at the time, as well as
the University’s President and Athletic Director, knew about Cole’s prior conduct
when they recruited and admitted him. See id. at 1290 (“Because Cole did not
meet UGA’s standards for admission, [the head coach] requested that [University
President Michael] Adams admit Cole through UGA’s special admissions policy.
Adams is the sole decision maker when admitting an applicant under the special
admissions policy.  Cole was admitted to attend UGA on a full scholarship.”).
46. Id. at 1295–96 (explaining University’s lack of action made students more
vulnerable to harm).
8
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where the past conduct occurred at a different school.47  This is
important because the NCAA allows student-athletes to transfer to a
new school and continue playing sports even when they have been
expelled for rape.48  Applying the reasoning from Williams, courts
can now hold university athletic departments liable for failing to
protect women from transfer athletes with records of sexual
misconduct.49
Similarly, before Simpson, schools could only be held liable if
they had prior knowledge that a specific assault would or did occur.50
Simpson opened the door for successful claims where an institution
is aware of official or unofficial policies that use women as bait—
essentially as escorts—in athletic recruiting.51  These baiting prac-
tices, which were already widely considered archaic when Simpson
was decided, are evidently still extant on some college campuses.52
47. See id. at 1305 (Jordan, J., concurring) (“I see no reason why a funding
recipient should avoid Title IX liability if, with prior knowledge of a prospective
student’s or teacher’s documented prior acts of serious sexual misconduct, it ad-
mits the student or hires the teacher and then fails to conduct any monitoring or
counseling, thereby placing other students in serious danger.  In such a scenario,
there should not and need not be any requirement that the victim be subjected to
a second act of discrimination or harassment before there can be Title IX
liability.”).
48. See Kenny Jacoby, A Football Star Was Expelled for Rape Twice.  A Secret Deal




[https://perma.cc/SR9W-GG98] (explaining Tristen Wallace, who was expelled
from University of Oregon for sexual misconduct of “apparent predatory nature,”
transferred and continued to play NCAA football for another school).
49. See Williams, 477 F.3d at 1296 (reasoning UGA’s failure to supervise Cole
or inform student-athletes of sexual harassment policy resulted in harm to Wil-
liams); see also Kenny Jacoby, NCAA Looks the Other Way as College Athletes Punished for
Sex Offenses Play On, USA Today (Dec. 16, 2019) https://www.usatoday.com/in-
depth/news/investigations/2019/12/12/ncaa-looks-other-way-athletes-punished-
sex-offenses-play/4360460002/ [https://perma.cc/B5C6-PZ27?type=image] (de-
tailing NCAA’s practice of allowing sexual offenders to continue playing college
sports with impunity).  For a further discussion of the absence of NCAA policy
regarding transfer athletes who have been expelled for sexual assault, see infra
notes 165–174 and accompanying text.
50. See Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1174 (interpreting “actual notice” requirement to
include institutional knowledge of general policies as well as individual incidents).
51. See Hunter, supra note 6, at 287 (citing Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1174).  For
further discussion of the University of Colorado’s effect on the actual knowledge
standard, see infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
52. For further discussion of these problematic “hostess” programs, see infra
notes 53–61, 58 and accompanying text.  College sports programs have been using
“hostess” programs to introduce high school students to the campus culture for
over fifty years. See Dashiell Bennett, A Brief History of Campus Recruiting Hostesses,
DEADSPIN (Dec. 9, 2009, 3:00 PM) https://deadspin.com/a-brief-history-of-campus-
recruiting-hostesses-5422547 [https://perma.cc/236N-988M] (providing historic
9
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In 2015, the defense lawyers for two Vanderbilt football players ac-
cused of rape referred to the team’s “hostess” program as part of a
culture characterized by sex and alcohol, which they asserted was to
blame for the defendants’ conduct.53  The 2017 Baylor football
rape scandal revealed the existence of a similar “recruiting” pro-
gram that led to prevalent, seemingly school-sanctioned sexual as-
sault.54  Baylor was found non-compliant with Title IX after an
investigation by Pepper Hamilton LLP.55  Baylor is only now consid-
ered compliant with Title IX conditionally upon the adoption of a
long list of proposed policy changes.56
In another recent case, the University of Tennessee was found
liable under Title IX for failing to take proper disciplinary action
after eight female students reported sexual assault.57  The institu-
tion had been aware of athletic department policies encouraging a
culture of sexual violence in athletic recruiting—specifically, by
baiting prospective student-athletes through “hostess” programs.58
overview of “hostess” programs in light of controversial Tennessee recruiting prac-
tices).  Each time a case comes to light, media coverage implies that the practice is
harmful and outdated. See generally Mulhere, infra note 53 (reporting problematic
nature of Vanderbilt’s “hostess” program in 2015); see also Hobson, infra note 54
(expressing surprise regarding existence of “hostess” program at Baylor in 2017).
53. See Kaitlin Mulhere, Hostesses? In 2015? Rape Trial Involving Former Vander-
bilt U. Football Players Revives Debate Over the Use of Attractive Women to Rope in Athletic
Recruits, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 27, 2015) https://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2015/01/27/concerns-continue-about-role-hostesses-football-recruiting
[https://perma.cc/DB5U-XWGN] (discussing outdated role of “hostess” programs
in college athletic recruiting).
54. See Hunter, supra  note 6, at 278 (“[C]ourt documents allege that football
staff members encouraged the use of sex to sell the program . . . .”) (citing Sarah
Mervosh, New Baylor Lawsuit Alleges 52 Rapes by Football Players in 4 Years, ‘Show ‘em a
Good Time’ Culture, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 27, 2017)); see also Will Hobson,
Baylor Rape Scandal Involves Recruiting ‘Hostess’ Program.  These Things Still Exist?
WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/
2017/02/02/baylor-rape-scandal-involves-recruiting-hostess-program-these-thing-
still-exist/ [https://perma.cc/GC8Z-NPUA] (reporting that using women as bait
in recruiting contributed to culture of sexual violence among Vanderbilt football
players).
55. See Baylor University Board of Regents, Findings of Fact, BAYLOR UNIV. 1, 1,
available  at https://www.baylor.edu/thefacts/doc.php/266596.pdf  [https://
perma.cc/7B6Z-LFY4] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020) (listing circumstances surround-
ing Pepper Hamilton’s engagement with Baylor University).
56. See December 2018 Summary of Baylor’s Title IX Improvements, BAYLOR UNIV.
(Dec.14, 2018), https://www.baylor.edu/thefacts/news.php?action=story&story
=205332 [https://perma.cc/HKW9-5MBT] (listing explicit actions taken by uni-
versity to be in better compliance with Title VII).
57. See generally Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 136 F. Supp. 3d 788 (M.D. Tenn. 2016)
(supporting idea that Tennessee case was rare instance in which complainants ac-
tually prevailed under “deliberate indifference” standard).
58. See id. (noting institutional knowledge of recruiting policies is sufficient to
subject university to liability).
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Still, this special “prior knowledge” liability does not extend person-
ally to the coaches, teachers, administrators, or other officials in-
volved because Title IX creates a cause of action only against the
institutions themselves.59
As such, even if a victim can prove that particular actors were
aware of informal policies or practices likely to encourage or toler-
ate sexual assault by athletes, the institution would not be held ac-
countable unless the victim could show that the right person or
persons knew.60  Congress enacted Title IX intending to eradicate
inequality between the sexes in educational settings.61  This noble
goal cannot be met until a realistic, effective framework is estab-
lished for preventing and responding to sexual assaults on
campus.62
B.  Title VII Liability
Like Title IX, workplace liability for sexual assault also stems
from a statute based in equality.63  Title IX was modeled after Title
59. See Hunter, supra note 6, at 287–88 (citing to Simpson v. Univ. of Colo.
Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007)).  Victims currently do not have a civil-suit
recourse against coaches, administrators, or athletic program staff who tolerated
or suppressed information about student-athlete sexual assault. See id. (“Decades
of deeply-rooted precedent require Title IX sexual harassment suits to be raised
against the university as opposed to individuals.”).  This often leaves victims with-
out a remedy where the school can claim it did not have institutional knowledge of
the behavior of a few bad actors in its employ. See id. (remarking courts and con-
gress are unlikely to institute new, individual form of liability for where individual
employees created hostile environment).
60. See Office of Civil Rights, supra note 26 (limiting knowledge by institution
to knowledge by “[a] responsible employee . . . who has the authority to take ac-
tion to redress the harassment”).
61. See Office for Civil Rights, Title IX and Sex Discrimination, DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html [https://
perma.cc/7UQL-L776] (last updated Jan. 10, 2020) (providing brief explanation
of thought process behind Title IX’s enactment).  Further explanation of legisla-
tive intent is hard to come by, “[g]iven the absence of statutory text” regarding
Congress’s reasoning for establishing the law. See Title IX and Sexual Harassment:
Private Rights of Action, Administrative Enforcement, and Proposed Regulations, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. 3 (Apr. 12, 2019) available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R45685.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES4A-4BSD] (prescribing solutions to endemic
sexual assault issue on college campuses).  Because of this, the majority of Title IX
interpretation and legal standards has come from the federal courts. See id. (not-
ing lack of legislative action has forced courts to create their own standard).
62. See Karen M. Tani, An Administrative Right to be Free from Sexual Violence?
Title IX Enforcement in Historical and Institutional Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1859
(“Stated simply, ‘rape with legal impunity’ creates ‘second-class citizens.’” (quoting
MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 182)).
63. See generally Christine J. Black & Wilson C. Freeman, Sexual Harassment and
Title VII: Selected Legal Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.  (Apr. 9, 2018) available at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45155.pdf [https://perma.cc/58YS-8Z6Y] (dis-
cussing basis of workplace liability for harassment).
11
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VII of the Civil Rights Act.64  Title VII does not expressly state a
prohibition on sexual assault or harassment, but the federal courts
have repeatedly read sexual harassment and assault into the mean-
ing of discrimination that affects an employee’s “terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment.”65  Title VII protects employees from a
range of abusive and harassing behaviors depending on their sever-
ity, but is generally understood to include rape and sexual assault.66
There are two cognizable claims under Title VII for sexual harass-
ment: quid pro quo and hostile environment.67  The latter of these
has largely shaped the interpretation of what qualifies as harass-
ment under Title IX.68  The term of art used to determine conduct
that constitutes a hostile environment, “severe or pervasive,” has
been recognized by the Supreme Court in Title IX peer-to-peer sex-
ual harassment cases.69
Under Title VII, employers can be liable for their employees’
sexual harassment whether the perpetrator is the victim’s supervi-
sor or a mere coworker.70  When the harasser is the victim’s supervi-
sor, and the harassment culminated in a “tangible employment
action,” strict liability applies to the employer.71  Where the accused
is the victim’s supervisor, but no tangible employment action was
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964) (providing text of Title VII); Hunter,
supra note 6, at 283 (“Congress intentionally derived Title IX from the language of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.”).
65. See Black & Freeman, supra note 63, at 2 (describing interpretation courts
have taken regarding Title VII’s application).
66. See id. at 4 (discussing extent of Title VII’s coverage).
67. See Michael E. Buchwald, Sexual Harassment in Education and Student Athlet-
ics: A Case for Why Title IX Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence Should Develop Independently
of Title VII, 67 MD. L. REV. 672, 680–81 (2008) (recognizing that, by not expressly
mentioning sexual harassment in either statute, Congress shifted responsibility of
defining sexual harassment as discrimination to courts).
68. See id. at 681 (asserting hostile environment jurisprudence under Title VII
greatly impacted institutional liability standard under Title IX).
69. See id. (“In the Title IX context, the Supreme Court has applied Title VII’s
‘severe or pervasive’ standard only in a student-to-student sexual harassment
case.”). See generally Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (ad-
dressing “severe or pervasive” standard in relation to peer-on-peer sexual
harassment).
70. See Black & Freeman, supra note 55, at 8 n.51 (discussing Court’s interpre-
tation of Title VII protection).
71. See id. (outlining two frameworks for supervisor sexual harassment liabil-
ity).  A “tangible employment action” can include firing, suspending, and failing to
promote. See generally Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)
(defining “tangible employment action” as “a significant change in employment
status” and providing examples); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998) (providing examples of “tangible employment action[s]”).
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taken, the employer has a possible affirmative defense.72  The avail-
able defense puts the burden on the employer to prove that it had
“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sex-
ually harassing behavior” and that “the plaintiff employee unrea-
sonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer to avoid harm otherwise.”73
The distinction between supervisor and coworker standards and the
availability of the affirmative defense serve the preventative and de-
terrent purposes of Title VII.74  These facets of the Title VII liability
scheme encourage employers to educate supervisors, and to pre-
vent and promptly correct behaviors once they are aware of a po-
tential sexual harassment issue.75  Moreover, the strict liability of
supervisor harassment where there is a tangible employment action
incentivizes employers to be vigilant, rather than intentionally igno-
rant, of supervisors’ propensities.76
The coworker sexual assault test is more difficult to satisfy.77
Where a coworker has sexually harassed or assaulted a fellow em-
ployee, the employer is held liable only if it knew or should have
known that the accused was likely to commit such an offense, and
still failed to intervene.78  This standard, although harder to prove
than the test for supervisor liability, results in more findings for the
harassed person than does Title IX’s “deliberate indifference” stan-
dard.79  While employers are given full due process and the oppor-
72. See Black & Freeman, supra note 63, at 8 n.53 (stating availability of affirm-
ative defense where victim’s supervisor did not take tangible employment action).
73. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (providing elements for affirmative defense to
supervisor harassment).
74. See Black & Freeman, supra note 63, at 9. (adding that Court also intended
to accommodate agency principles, which impose vicarious employer liability). See
also Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421, 429–30 (2013) (reinforcing Su-
preme Court’s position that agency law requires strict liability in cases of supervisor
harassment).
75. See Black & Freeman, supra note 63, (discussing incentive provided to em-
ployers by vicarious liability standard).
76. See id. (noting legal benefits of implementing vicarious liability into Title
VII framework). But see Tani, supra note 62, at 1862 (describing less ethical incen-
tive posed by Title IX liability).
77. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (“With respect to conduct between fellow
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the work-
place where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or
should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action.”).  See Black & Freeman, supra note 63, at 13 (ex-
plaining co-worker harassment standard is negligence, not strict liability).
78. See Black & Freeman, supra note 63, at 13 (laying out negligence test for
co-worker sexual harassment).
79. Compare Walker, supra note 40, at 100–01 (observing “actual knowledge”
and “deliberate indifference” have typically frustrated Title IX suits alleging institu-
tional mismanagement of sexual assault claims) with Black & Freeman, supra note
13
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tunity to show that they did not know of the risk, employers also
have a strong incentive to take proactive measures to rid the work-
place of dangerous persons.80  In keeping with this incentive, many
workplaces provide mandatory Title VII sexual harassment train-
ing.81  First, the training acts as a sort of insurance policy if the em-
ployer is being accused of doing nothing to prevent harassment.82
Second, the training—when done correctly and taken in earnest—
is a genuine preventive measure that educates employees and su-
pervisors about appropriate workplace behavior.83
C.  History of Proposed Solutions
This Comment is not the first to propose reform to the Title IX
model of institutional liability.84  In the past, legal scholars and
commentators have suggested various approaches to remedy, or
even replace, the current standards of accountability.85  Among the
63, at 14 (“[A] company cannot escape liability by adopting a ‘see no evil, hear no
evil’ strategy. An employer which lacks reasonable mechanisms or procedures for
reporting misconduct, for example, may be charged with constructive knowledge
of the co-worker harassment at issue.”).
80. See Walker, supra note 40, at 100–01 (describing new form of victim-
friendly liability, “before-the-fact-deliberate indifference”).
81. See Sheila Engelmeier & Sue Fischer, Discrimination and Harassment Train-
ing, ENGELMEIER & UMANAH 1, 5, (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) available at https://
www.e-ulaw.com/Articles/Discrimination_and_Harassment_Training.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/7YEW-SE2N] (noting most states do not require sexual harassment
training, but most companies elect to include harassment training in their supervi-
sor and manager training programs); see also Find Out If Your State Requires Sexual
Harassment Training, INSPIRED ELEARNING (June 25, 2019), https://inspiredelearn-
ing.com/hr-compliance/state-specific-compliance-training/sexual-harassment-
training-requirements-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/LGX7-5CDT] (listing state-by-
state requirements for sexual harassment training).
82. See Engelmeier & Fischer, supra note 81 at 1 (stating, while EEOC does
not strictly require that all workplaces offer sexual harassment training, most com-
panies elect to include harassment training in their supervisor and manager train-
ing, particularly because courts look to effective training when assessing whether
employer has taken steps to prevent harassment under Title VII).
83. See id. (suggesting “providing effective training to all employees makes a
favorable impact on employees and creates a workplace environment free from
harassment and discrimination”).
84. See, e.g., Ashley Hartmann, Reworking Sexual Assault Response on University
Campuses: Creating a Rights-Based Empowerment Model to Minimize Institutional Liability,
48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 287 (2015) (demonstrating disconnect between sexual
assault victims’ needs and the ineffective policies that are currently in place);
Buchwald, supra note 67 (criticizing courts for relying on Title VII frameworks to
solve Title IX cases); Emma Ellman-Golan, Saving Title IX: Designing More Equitable
and Efficient Investigation Procedures, 116 MICH. L. REV. 155 (2017) (discussing meth-
ods of Title IX enforcement to reduce number of sexual assaults on college
campuses).
85. See Jayma M. Meyer, It’s on the NCAA: A Playbook for Eliminating Sexual As-
sault, 67 SYR. L. REV. 357, 378–80 (2017) (discussing increased rate of sexual vio-
lence among athletes as compared to overall student population).  Proposed
14
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most vocal is a call for common law tort liability, usually emphasiz-
ing premises liability because a majority of university sexual assaults
occur on the school’s campus.86  If a university knows there have
been prior assaults on campus property but fails to warn students or
prevent future incidents, a victim can claim common law premises
liability.87  Essentially, premises liability will hold institutions ac-
countable for dorm-room rapes and encourage them to focus risk
management efforts on the highest-risk areas on campus.88  It fol-
lows that holding universities to a greater liability standard for the
abusive actions of one of their highest-risk populations—that of
male student-athletes—will encourage schools to proactively investi-
gate their athletic programs’ practices and policies regarding sexual
assault.89
Several other theories of tort law have been used, with varying
degrees of success, to attribute responsibility for students’ criminal
acts to their educational institutions.90  Under the third-party liabil-
ity doctrine, a university could potentially be liable in tort for the
violent actions of a student-athlete if the criminal acts of the athlete
reasons for the rate of male athletes’ violent behavior include hyper-masculine self-
image and status, peer encouragement of abuse, training centered around aggres-
sion, and institutional tolerance and protection for perpetrators. See id. (sug-
gesting potential explanations for correlation between athletic participation and
violent behavior); see also B. David Ridpath, The Attitude Toward Sexual and Athlete
Violence in College Sports Must Change, FORBES (Sept. 15, 2016, 9:04 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/bdavidridpath/2016/09/15/the-attitude-toward-sexual-and-
athlete-violence-in-college-sports-must-change/#4be44bc35eaf [https://perma.cc/
KN3V-TUXB] (discussing prior proposed changes to Title IX).
86. See generally Andrea A. Curico, Institutional Failure, Campus Sexual Assault
and Danger in the Dorms: Regulatory Limits and the Promise of Tort Law, 78 MONT. L.
REV. 31 (2017) (exploring tort liability as method of influencing institutional reac-
tions regarding sexual assault).
87. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 40 (Am. Law
Inst. 2010) (designating university-student relationship as one giving rise to reason-
able duty of care). See also Curico, supra note 86, at 62 (suggesting universities
have special duty to protect students from dorm-based sexual assault where similar
incidents have occurred in vicinity).
88. See Curico, supra note 86, at 62 (explaining how most on-campus sexual
assaults occur within university-owned and -operated dormitories).
89. See Meyer, supra note 85, at 378 (stating increased likelihood of male ath-
letes to sexually assault other students); see also Katie Malafronte, College Athletes
More Likely to be Accused of Sexual Misconduct, CAMPUS SAFETY (Nov. 14, 2018) https:/
/www.campussafetymagazine.com/clery/college-athletes-more-likely-accused-sex-
ual-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/LYN4-4YCJ] (noting that at West Virginia
University, male athletes accounted for thirteen percent of Title IX complaints
over six year period).
90. See generally Gil B. Fried, Illegal Moves Off-the-Field: University Liability for Ille-
gal Acts of Student-Athletes, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORTS 69 (1997) (exploring various
legal avenues that could be taken to impose institutional liability for individual
athlete criminal conduct).
15
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are reasonably foreseeable.91  If not the institution as a whole, at
least the coaches and athletic departments that exercise significant
control over the recruiting, training, and discipline of athletes
should be considered to have a special relationship with student-
athletes capable of triggering third-party duty.92  A theory of negli-
gent recruiting has been proposed to hold universities accountable
for admitting students whose records or propensities are or should
be known at the time of recruitment.93
Before Gebser and Davis, theories of tort-law negligence, includ-
ing hostile work environment, allowed plaintiffs to assert claims
against universities that knew or should have known of an assail-
ant’s criminal tendencies.94  Today, courts will only impose tort lia-
bility where there exists explicit reason to believe there is a special
relationship or assumption of duty to protect the plaintiff.95
Contract theories of liability have also been used to implicate
universities for injuries to students resulting from sexual assault.96
Accordingly, as a result of the purported contractual relationship
between university and student, the university has a duty to protect
that person while he or she is associated with the institution.97  Al-
ternatively, plaintiffs can also argue that their enrollment consti-
tuted a contractual relationship creating a duty to keep them from
harm from other students.98  Based on the contract theory, scholars
91. See id. at 80 (suggesting based on Restatement (2d) of Torts §§ 315 and
319 that institutional liability for third-party conduct could apply where special
relationship with student-athlete makes his violence foreseeable to university).
92. See Hunter, supra note 6, at 291 (assessing applicability of special situation
duty theories to student-athlete harassers and their universities).
93. See Fried, supra note 90, at 83 (extending negligent hiring theory to uni-
versity recruitment).
94. See id. at 85–86 (noting that analysis will focus on “whether the university
created or implicitly condoned hostile environment”).
95. See generally See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 40
cmt. l (Am. Law Inst. 2012) (describing circumstances in which courts have found
affirmative duty of colleges to students, “often relying on other aspects [besides the
student-school relationship] between the college and its students to justify impos-
ing a duty”). See also Hunter, supra note 6, at 293 (proposing solutions to deficien-
cies of state tort law in addressing campus sexual assault).
96. See Fried, supra note 90, at 89 (discussing implied and express contractual
relationship between university and students).
97. See id. (explaining how contract theory has been asserted to show duty of
care to matriculated students).
98. See id. (“Both student-athletes and regular tuition-paying students are con-
tractually agreeing to provide service or pay tuition in exchange for a university’s
obligation to provide an education in an appropriate educational setting.”).
16
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and courts have made arguments to support the application of Title
VII doctrine to peer-to-peer student sexual assault.99
As it stands, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title IX cre-
ates a cause of action against universities only where victims can
show that the institution itself acted with deliberate indifference de-
spite having actual knowledge of a specific risk of sexual harass-
ment.100  This narrow set of circumstances leaves many victims
without a remedy where student-athletes who are under the special
supervision and control of the university are allowed to commit sex-
ual misconduct with impunity.101  While student-athletes need not
be uniformly considered employees of their universities, a contract
theory of liability allows courts to analyze the employment-like rela-
tionship inherent in certain high profile college sports when deter-
mining how to resolve sexual assault allegations against student-
athletes.102  Similarly, theories of tort law including third party duty
and premises liability create causes of action where an institution
can be liable for the behavior of its students even without arguing
that there is an employment-like relationship.103  These arguments
collectively serve to bridge the gap between the Supreme Court’s
generalized solution to Title IX sexual assault analysis from 1998
and the proposal laid out in this Comment with respect to a particu-
99. See Timothy Davis & Tonya Parker, Student-Athlete Sexual Violence Against
Women: Defining the Limits of Institutional Responsibility, 55 WASH & LEE L. REV. 55,
107–10 (1998) (noting circuit split in 1998—before Davis standardized test for
peer harassment—as evidence that courts could apply Title VII standard to deter-
mine liability for student-athlete sexual harassment under Title IX). See, e.g.,
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 132 F.3d 949, 957
(4th Cir. 1997) (finding University properly applied Title VII “knew or should have
known” standard to Title IX sexual harassment case) (vacated en banc 1998); see
also, e.g., Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1994) (requiring “inten-
tional discrimination” standard in Title IX case where university was accused of
erroneous outcome in sexual harassment disciplinary proceedings).
100. For a further discussion of the “deliberate indifference” standard first
articulated by the Supreme Court in 1998, see supra notes 34–39 and accompany-
ing text.
101. For a further discussion of how difficult it has been for victims to meet
the “deliberate indifference” standard, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion of the lack of alternate remedy available to victims of cam-
pus sexual assault, see infra notes 165, 188–190, and accompanying text.
102. See Davis & Parker, supra note 99, at 109–10 (recounting courts’ discus-
sion of contractual nature of athlete-university relationship when deciding whether
commercial reality amounted to employment status such that Title VII standard of
liability could be implicated into Title IX sexual harassment analysis).
103. For a further discussion of the various tort theories that have been pro-
posed to reform campus sexual assault litigation, see supra notes 86–95 and accom-
panying text.
17
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lar class of students who pose a statistically higher risk of danger to
their peers.104
III. LIKE A BOSS: A BETTER MODEL IS NEEDED TO REVIEW TITLE
IX SEXUAL HARASSMENT SUITS NAMING STUDENT-ATHLETES AS
ASSAILANTS
This section expands on the problems with existing Title IX
jurisprudence and proposes a new model that courts could use to
achieve more just results for victims of campus sexual assault.105
First, subsection A reveals the source of inconsistencies in Title IX
and Title VII sexual harassment standards, including an analysis of
the critical response to the Supreme Court’s decision to use a
higher standard in Title IX sexual harassment cases.106  Subsection
B examines the effects of ineffective agency guidance on incentiviz-
ing institutional ignorance and introduces a possible solution.107
Finally, subsection C fleshes out a proposal for courts to adopt the
agency principles of Title VII into their analysis of sexual assault
cases under Title IX.108  Because agency law sounds in equity, the
section concludes with a policy analysis to support the adoption of
agency principles into the Title IX analysis of sexual assault cases
naming high-profile athletes.109
A. Criticism of Title IX Interpretation under Gebser
The distinction the Supreme Court relied on in determining
that sexual harassment in education, unlike in the workplace, does
not present a direct basis for vicarious liability resulted from a textu-
alist technicality.110  The majority in Gebser, which determined the
104. See Young, supra note 19, at 804 (finding male college athletes seventy-
seven percent more likely than other male students to use sexual coercion, includ-
ing violence).
105. For a further discussion of the proposed reform, see infra notes 199–213
and accompanying text.
106. For a further discussion of critical response to the case establishing the
Title IX sexual harassment standard, see infra notes 110–129 and accompanying
text.
107. For a further discussion of regulatory guidance, see infra notes 130–161
and accompanying text.
108. For a further discussion of the proposal, see infra notes 199–213 and
accompanying text.
109. For a further discussion of policy, see infra notes 225–253 and accompa-
nying text.
110. See Buchwald, supra note 67 (arguing that application of Title VII stan-
dards to Title IX sexual harassment cases is inadequate); Sexual Harassment in Edu-
cation and Student Athletics: A Case for Why Title IX Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence
Should Develop Independently of Title VII, 67 MD. L. REV. 672, 679–680 (2008) (ex-
plaining that the Court in Gebser did not apply common law agency liability be-
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institutional liability test for Title IX sexual harassment used to this
day, was a narrow five-justice majority whose reasoning turned on
the literal language, rather than legislative intent, of the laws under
consideration.111  Failing to address the role Title VII had in creat-
ing Title IX, the justices instead distinguished a prior Title IX case
in which the Court made a direct comparison between the two laws
in order to establish sexual harassment as a form of discrimination
under Title IX.112
  1. A Divided Opinion
In a dissent penned by Justice Stevens, the remaining four jus-
tices agreed that the majority’s holding was “at odds with settled
principles of agency law” under which an employer is liable where
the harasser  “was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence
of the agency relation.”113  The dissent further asserts that Title IX,
which was written in passive language to direct focus to the victims
of discrimination, should therefore have “broader coverage than Ti-
tle VII.”114  Justice Stevens reasoned the purpose of Title IX’s prohi-
bition against sex discrimination was to incentivize schools to adopt
and enforce preventive policies that minimize risks of sexual harass-
ment and assault.115  He wrote:
cause the definition of “employer” in Title IX does not explicitly list agents of the
institution as does the corresponding definition in Title VII).
111. See Kathleen Mary Elaine Mayer, Schools are Employers Too: Rethinking the
Institutional Liability Standard in Title IX Teacher-on-Student Sexual Harassment Suits,
50 GA. L. REV. 909, 939 (2016) (noting Court in Gebser failed to consider Congres-
sional intent).
112. See Buchwald, supra note 67, at 679–80 (“The Court refused to apply
agency principles, clarifying that it had compared Franklin, a Title IX case, to Mer-
itor, a Title VII case, only in reference to the general principle that sexual harass-
ment can constitute discrimination in violation of Title IX.” (referring to Franklin
v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. School, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) and Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986))); see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998) (“Whether educational institutions can be said to
violate Title IX based solely on principles of respondeat superior or constructive no-
tice was not resolved by Franklin’s citation of Meritor.  That reference to Meritor was
made with regard to the general proposition that sexual harassment can constitute
discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX. . . .”).
113. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 299 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Restatement (2d) of Agency, § 219(2)(d) (1957)).  Jus-
tice Stevens’s dissent was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer. See id.
114. See id. at 296 (emphasizing “broad sweep” of language in Title IX, citing
to previous Supreme Court cases that held scope of statute’s coverage should cor-
respond with that broad language).
115. See id. at 300 (discussing Congress’s purpose in making federal funding
conditional on schools working to eradicate sex discrimination).
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The rule that the Court has crafted creates the opposite
incentive.  As long as school boards can insulate them-
selves from knowledge about this sort of conduct, they can
claim immunity from damages liability.  Indeed, the rule
that the Court adopts would preclude a damages remedy
even if every teacher at the school knew about the harass-
ment but did not have the ‘authority to institute corrective
measures on the district’s behalf.116
Justice Ginsburg’s separate dissent, joined by Justices Souter
and Breyer, argued the Court should recognize schools’ effective
reporting and remedial policies as an affirmative defense to Title
IX charges of sexual harassment “[in] line with the tort law doc-
trine of avoidable consequences.”117  The dissenting Justices be-
lieved such a regime would disqualify plaintiffs whose injury
resulted from their own failure to take advantage of available pre-
ventive and remedial measures.118  This principle mirrors the judi-
cial interpretation of Title VII, which has long provided an
affirmative defense for employers who have provided adequate pre-
ventive and corrective services where the plaintiff has failed to take
advantage of those opportunities.119
2. Post-Gebser and -Davis Commentary
Immediately after the Supreme Court created disparate stan-
dards of liability under Title VII and Title IX sexual harassment,
commentators began criticizing the discrepancy.120  One such criti-
cism lamented the fact that, under Gebser, minor schoolchildren
now received less protection against sexual harassment by their
teachers than adult employees have against the same conduct by
116. Id. at 300–01 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (criticizing majority’s holding).
117. See id. at 307 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).  The affirmative defense men-
tioned is available in cases of Title VII supervisor sexual harassment, where em-
ployers would otherwise be strictly liable. See id. (suggesting organizations should
be able to avoid liability by proving they took appropriate preventative measures).
For a further discussion of the Title VII defense, see supra notes 72–75 and accom-
panying text.
118. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 307 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (modeling proposal
after affirmative defense created by Court for employer-defendants in Title VII
sexual harassment suits).  For a further discussion of this proposed solution, see
infra note 119 and accompanying text.
119. For a further discussion of the Title VII affirmative defense, see supra
notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
120. For a further discussion of criticisms of Gebser in the months and years
following the decision, see infra notes 121–130 and accompanying text.
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their peers.121  The same article proposed that Congress amend Ti-
tle IX to expressly authorize a vicarious liability standard, pointing
as an example to multiple prior acts passed by Congress to super-
sede the Court’s interpretation of Title IX.122
Another contemporary criticism of the inconsistency in the
Court’s civil rights doctrine explains the faulty reasoning behind
distinguishing Gebser from Title VII cases:
The Court has accepted limited vicarious liability under
Title VII, but rejected it under Title IX. . . . Yet, nothing in
the statutory language or legislative history of these laws
justifies the differences in the Court’s treatment of respon-
deat superior liability under these statutes. . . . Thus, our
conclusion is that the standard for vicarious liability
should be the same under Title VII [and Title IX].  Under
each statute, the Court should allow vicarious liability of
employers to further the underlying goals for the
statutes.123
The majority in Gebser attempted to justify its decision to re-
quire actual notice and deliberate indifference in Title IX sexual
harassment cases by asserting that it would be contrary to public
policy to expose voluntary federal funding recipients to post-hoc
liability for violating conditions to the funding of which they did
121. See Amy K. Graham, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: The
Supreme Court’s Determination That Children Deserve Less Protection Than Adults from
Sexual Harassment, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 551, 588–89 (1999) (noting unreasonable
effect caused by Court’s inconsistent holdings, issued four days apart, regarding
Title VII and Title IX vicarious liability).
122. See id. at 598 (insisting Congress amend Title IX to include vicarious
liability standard akin to that established for Title VII by judicial doctrine).  In
response to Supreme Court decisions determining that Title IX conditions reach
only those parts of an educational institution that receive federal funding, Con-
gress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, which explained its intent
that Title IX reach all aspects of an educational institution. See id. at 567–68 (dis-
cussing Civil Rights Restoration Act).  Congress similarly overruled the Court with
the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986, which clarified that
state educational institutions waive Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting
federal funds, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding to the contrary. See
id. at 568 (discussing Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act).
123. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 799 (disagreeing with Court’s dis-
parate standards of vicarious liability under Title IX and Title VII).  Fisk and
Chemerinsky go so far as to propose that a tort-law standard of strict agency liabil-
ity should apply under all civil rights statutes. See id. (“The preferable approach
would be for the Court to interpret these civil rights statutes to further the underly-
ing goals that they were meant to achieve: deterrence of violations of civil rights
and compensation for injuries . . . . Holding employers liable for their employees’
actions creates an incentive for employers to prevent wrongful conduct.”).
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not have express notice.124  This, too, drew negative attention
among contemporary legal commentators, who disagreed with the
Court’s reading of Title IX.125  The Court emphasized in Gebser and
Davis that Title IX, unlike Title VII, is based in a contractual rela-
tionship between the federal government and its funding recipi-
ents, and therefore greater notice needs to be provided before
litigation can deprive a school of funds due to sexual harassment.126
However, federal funding recipients were already on notice
that sex discrimination—which includes sexual harassment—is  ex-
pressly prohibited by Title IX’s prohibition of discrimination in fed-
erally funded programs.127  Thus, the contract theory on which the
Court based its holdings in Gebser and Davis does not necessarily
lead to a significant distinction between the appropriate notice
standards for sexual harassment suits under Title IX and Title
VII.128  Government-funded educational institutions should there-
fore be liable for conduct about which they knew or should have
known, rather than only the severe and pervasive conduct of which
they had actual notice.129
124. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 289–90 (1998)
(asserting federal funding recipients lacked actual notice of potential liability).
125. See Daniel P. Colling, Statutory Modification Needed for Title IX in Light of
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 45 WAYNE L. REV 1565 (1999); see also
Kristen Safier, A Request for Congressional Action: Deconstructing the Supreme Court’s
(In)Activism in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 118 S. Ct. 1989
(1998) and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999), 68
U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1326 (2000) (criticizing Court in Gebser for narrow construc-
tion of Title IX sexual harassment test).
126. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286–90 (asserting federal funding recipients’ lack
of actual notice made private remedy impossible under Title IX); see also Davis v.
Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ. 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999) (reiterating, under contract
theory, “private damages are available only where recipients of federal funding had
adequate notice that they could be liable for the conduct at issue”).
127. See Safier, supra note 125, at 1326 (noting sexual harassment had been
previously recognized as form of sex discrimination in line of Supreme Court
cases).
128. See id. at 1326–27 (“The importation of agency law principles into Title
VII sexual harassment should have given [schools] clear notice of their potential
liability under such a standard, given Congress’ intent to apply Title VII require-
ments to education through Title IX.”).
129. See Colling, supra note 125, at 1588–93 (advocating for agency-law stan-
dard more similar to Title VII sexual assault liability inquiry).  Colling also sug-
gested an affirmative defense such as the one proffered by Justice Ginsburg, which
would protect schools that had taken appropriate measures to prevent harassment.
See id. at 1596–97 (noting such scheme would “provide the necessary incentive for
school districts to take preventative action”).
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B.  Practical Failures of Title IX in Addressing Sexual Assault
In practice, the Gebser ruling has created a nearly impossible
hurdle for sexual harassment plaintiffs to overcome.130  The De-
partment of Education, in its interpretations of Title IX and its in-
vestigations into compliance, has not done much to elucidate the
matter.131  The vague and inconsistent administrative guidance has
left schools unsure what precautions and procedures need to be in
place, leading them to provide as little as possible in terms of pre-
vention and deterrence measures.132
Unclear requirements in Title IX policy create two distinct but
entwined issues: universities fail to take preventive measures against
sexual assault, and the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) is incapable
of holding institutions accountable because it has failed to provide
adequate notice of what measures are appropriate.133  While stu-
dent-athletes do not need to be uniformly considered employees of
their universities, a framework allowing courts to make the analogy
for the purpose of heightening universities’ respondeat superior liabil-
ity could fill some of the gaps left by agency guidance.134  As a re-
sult, universities will be incentivized to be vigilant and take
protective measures against sexual assault by student-athletes.135
1. Ineffective Guidance
Title IX’s prohibition of sex discrimination is the minimum re-
sponse standard legally required of universities.136  The OCR,
whose guidance has significant bearing on the policy framework of
Title IX enforcement, is an administrative agency subject to the
130. See MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 2090 (noting prescience of Gebser dis-
senters’ comment that Title IX would largely preclude recovery).
131. For a further discussion of the Education Department’s vague adminis-
trative guidance, see infra notes 137155 and accompanying text.
132. See MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 2102 (asserting OCR guidance since
Gebser has been insufficient to provide adequate reprieve to survivors of sexual
assault).
133. See id. (remarking on insufficiencies in OCR enforcement and
guidance).
134. See id. at 2102–03 (suggesting supplementing OCR enforcement with up-
dated institutional liability standard for private actions under Title IX would pro-
vide better remedies for survivors of campus sexual assault).
135. See id. at 2105 (“Under this proactive liability concept, rooted in Title
IX’s plain language, the institutional incentive to address rape cultures and redress
sexual assault in schools would be restored and significantly strengthened[.]”).
136. See Ashley Hartmann, Reworking Sexual Assault Response on University Cam-
puses: Creating a Rights-Based Empowerment Model to Minimize Institutional Liability, 48
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 287, 293 (2015) (asserting that rape myths and sex stereo-
types influence universities’ compliance with Title IX and limit meaningful sexual
assault response).
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whims of appointed officials.137  While the OCR has the potential to
effect meaningful policy change, it also has the ability to withdraw
those changes.138  Allowing courts to have more flexibility in assess-
ing institutional liability in Title IX sexual harassment suits would
lessen the impact of political changes in the executive branch.139
With a facts-based inquiry into whether a particular student-ath-
lete’s relationship to the school resembles an agency relationship,
courts can achieve equitable outcomes despite a lack of effective
OCR guidance on point.140
Although the OCR has periodically released guidelines to ad-
vise colleges on how best to address these issues, the Department of
Education’s formal role in regulatory oversight has been increas-
ingly limited.141  Its most recent binding statement is from 2001,
just after the Supreme Court set the standard for analyzing sexual
harassment liability under Title IX.142  There have been many in-
terim policy statements issued by the OCR, but none since 2001
have been passed through the notice-and-comment administrative
137. See id. at 297–98 (noting power of OCR’s advisory capacity in advocating
for progressive responses to university discrimination, particularly praising Dear
Colleague Letter).  Since Hartmann’s Note, the new administration’s OCR has
withdrawn the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and enacted a politically different set of
policies regarding sexual assault response, shifting its focus to the rights of the
accused. See Candice Jackson, Dear Colleague, DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 22, 2017), avail-
able at https://www.cmu.edu/title-ix/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G5U2-MWFE] (rescinding previous administration’s Dear Colleague
Letter).
138. See Office  for  Civil  Rights, Sex  Discrimination,  Policy  Guidance, DEP’T
OF  EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/faq/rr/poli-
cyguidance/sex.html [https://perma.cc/J364-SS2X] (last updated Apr. 21, 2020)
(noting 2017 guidance withdrew statements of policy and guidance published by
OCR under previous administration); see also Tani, supra note 62 at 1892 (noting
OCR’s susceptibility to change due to successive administrations’ political
influence).
139. See R. Shep Melnick, The Transformation of Title IX: Regulating Gender
Equality in Education, 262–64 (2018) (criticizing effect of political parties’ expan-
sion and retrenchment of OCR guidelines and remarking, “neither OCR nor the
courts have given any serious consideration to how Title IX regulation has contrib-
uted to the pathologies of commercialized college sports”).
140. For a further discussion of how applying Title VII institutional liability to
Title IX cases on a case-by-case basis would be an appropriate solution, see infra
notes 214–222 and accompanying text.
141. See NASPA – Student Affairs Administrators in Higher Education, Back-
ground Brief: Title IX & Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, NASPA (2018) availa-
ble at https://www.naspa.org/images/uploads/main/Title_IX_Sexual_Assault_
Background_Brief_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6Y6-VWT3] (outlining expan-
sion and reduction of OCR’s regulatory guidance regarding sexual assault).
142. See Office for Civil Rights, supra note 30 (revising 1997 guidance in re-
sponse to 1998 and 1999 Supreme Court decisions).
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regulatory process that implements the statements as agency rules
with the force and effect of law.143
Moreover, the current administration has repealed prior policy
statements that provided enforcement instruction, leaving a gap in
Title IX interpretation while the Department “develop[s] an ap-
proach to student sexual misconduct that responds to the concerns
of stakeholders . . . . through a rulemaking process that responds to
public comment.”144  Even before the previous administration’s gui-
dance was withdrawn, it was not uniformly implemented by schools
and courts.145  For example, the OCR’s 2011 write-up on sexual har-
assment rights included the assertion that “[i]f a school knows or
reasonably should know about sexual harassment or sexual violence
. . . the school must take immediate action to eliminate the sexual
harassment or sexual violence, prevent its recurrence, and address
its effects.”146  In practice, courts deciding Title IX cases rarely, if
ever, used a “knew or should have known” standard of institutional
culpability.147  The OCR’s vague and inconsistent guidelines have
resulted in relatively laissez-faire campus sexual harassment policies
143. See Office for Civil Rights Issues Dear Colleague Letter on Title IX, CLERY
CENTER (Sep. 22, 2017) https://clerycenter.org/article/office-for-civil-rights-is-
sues-dear-colleague-letter-on-title-ix/ (noting 2001 Revised Guidance, unlike Dear
Colleague Letters, is binding regulation).
144. Jackson, supra note 137 (withdrawing Obama-era policy statements on
sexual violence).  The OCR has yet to replace the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and
2014 Q&A on Title IX and Sexual Violence with a concrete policy. See Office for
Civil Rights, Sex Discrimination, DEP’T OF EDUC., (last visited Jan. 17, 2020) https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/faq/rr/policyguidance/sex.html
[https://perma.cc/3CER-RCXR] (listing most recent development as 2017 with-
drawal of 2011 and 2014 guidance).
145. See S. Daniel Carter, In Defense of the Title IX Dear Colleague Letter, HuffPost






perma.cc/37N4-VYM7] (stating 2011 Letter was only “one step on the road to im-
proving how educational institutions better respond to sexual violence”).
146. See Office for Civil Rights, Know Your Rights: Title IX Prohibits Sexual Har-
assment and Sexual Violence Where You Go to School, DEP’T OF EDU., https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/title-ix-rights-201104.html [https://
perma.cc/K3S9-F6M7] (last updated Jan. 10, 2020) (explaining what schools must
do to comply with Title IX’s prohibition on sexual harassment and sexual
violence).
147. See Ellison, supra note 29 at 2144 (discussing standard used in assessing
vicarious liability under Title IX).
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that go unpunished until tragedy strikes.148  When that does hap-
pen, the school is reprimanded, but not penalized, by the OCR.149
When the OCR investigates and proposes resolutions to allega-
tions that universities have failed to meet the requirements of Title
IX, it issues a letter to the school with its findings and suggests mini-
mum improvements the school must make to be in compliance go-
ing forward.150  These decisions are made on a case-by-case basis,
and as a result, there is no binding framework for the resolutions
given.151  The few formal policy statements the OCR makes public
are approved by individual officials who are employed by an under-
staffed executive agency.152  Further, the language of these advisory
documents often falls short of actionable advice.153  The current
manual for interpreting and enforcing Title IX has been criticized
for its vagueness, which gives the OCR staff broad discretion to dis-
miss claims.154  As a result, the OCR has reduced its investigative
148. See Walker, supra note 40, at 99–100 (referring to universities’ risk man-
agement strategy of refusing to investigate for fear of creating actual notice).
149. See What is Title IX?, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUNDATION https://
www.womenssportsfoundation.org/advocacy/what-is-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/
74AW-7G75] (“When institutions are determined to be out of compliance with the
law, the United States Department of Education (OCR) finds them ‘in compliance
conditioned on remedying identified problems.’”).
150. See Office  for  Civil  Rights, How  the  Office  for  Civil  Rights Handles
Complaints, DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/com-
plaints-how.html [https://perma.cc/5A5Q-RUVY] (last updated Jan. 10, 2020)
(“OCR’s determination will be explained in a Letter of Findings sent to the com-
plainant and recipient.  Letters of Findings contain fact-specific investigative find-
ings and dispositions of individual cases.”).
151. See id. (“Letters of Findings are not formal statements of OCR policy and
they should not be relied upon, cited, or construed as such.”); see also Walker, supra
note 40, at 99 (noting OCR’s vague policy guidance and ad hoc compliance review
as contributing factors to schools’ broad discretion in developing and enforcing
sexual assault response policy).
152. See Office for Civil Rights, supra note 150 (“OCR’s formal policy state-
ments are approved by a duly authorized OCR official and made available to the
public.”); see also Andrew Kreighbaum, Under DeVos, a Smaller Department of Educa-
tion, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 13, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2018/06/13/education-department-staff-down-13-percent-trump-administration-
began [https://perma.cc/QJ7R-5DNG] (reporting OCR  lost eleven percent of its
already insufficient workforce between 2017 and 2018 under newly appointed Sec-
retary of Education).
153. See Kristy L. McCray, Intercollegiate Athletes and Sexual Violence: A Review of
Literature and Recommendations for Future Study, 16 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 438,
441 (2015), (referring to language of 2011 Dear Colleague Letter as too vague to
facilitate uniform compliance).
154. See Andrew Kreighbaum, As Civil Rights Office Gets More Money, It Limits
Investigations, INSIDE HIGHER ED (March 30, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.
com/news/2018/03/30/more-money-civil-rights-office-comes-it-narrows-its-investi-
gative-work [https://perma.cc/S9MQ-7Q4E] (noting that  2017 manual directs
staff to dismiss complaints based on “credible information” that indicates investiga-
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activity, despite a recent increase in funding from Congress that
could be interpreted as the legislature rejecting the administra-
tion’s education priorities.155
Relying on a more consistent base of case law rather than polit-
ically motivated advisory documents may stabilize the doctrine of
institutional sex discrimination review.156  The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or the “Commission”), another
civil rights agency within the federal government, adjudicates cases
whose holdings then have precedential force on future employ-
ment discrimination matters.157  Additionally, the EEOC is empow-
ered to sue nonfederal employers for discrimination and to serve as
amicus curiae in non-EEOC cases.158  The EEOC’s Title VII doctrine
has evolved over decades to include protection against sexual orien-
tation discrimination, among other shifts in keeping with the mod-
ern understanding of equality.159  Even with a 2-1 Republican
majority, the Commission has expressed an unwillingness to go
back on its decision that gender identity is a cognizable form of
discrimination under Title VII.160  If Title IX adjudication were
tion is “no longer appropriate,” without defining or explaining either of these
terms).
155. See id. (“Although the omnibus spending package has been interpreted
as Congress rejecting several DeVos priorities, it won’t undo the change in course
her department has already chartered for the Office for Civil Rights.”)
156. For a further discussion of useful regulatory guidance, see infra notes
157–161 and accompanying text.
157. See Administrative Enforcement and Litigation, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
EMPL. COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement_litigation.cfm [https://
perma.cc/7AN9-AEW7] (last visited Apr. 26, 2020) (“Commission Decisions are
the Commission’s determination on a specific charge of discrimination involving a
private employer, or a state or local government employer, where the Commission
votes to express official agency policy to be applied in similar cases by EEOC.  They
are distinct from appellate decisions by the Commission on federal employees’
complaints of discrimination.”).  Commission Decisions, unlike Letters of Determi-
nation that EEOC field offices are authorized to make, must be approved by a
majority of the Commissioners because they represent official EEOC policy. See
Commission Decisions and Commission Opinion Letters, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPL.
COMM’N https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/decisions/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/
UFK9-XQKY] (last visited Apr. 29, 2020) (noting Commission Decision process).
158. See Administrative Enforcement and Litigation, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
EMPL. COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement_litigation.cfm [https://
perma.cc/AD7F-HHEL] (last visited Apr. 29, 2020) (describing roles of EEOC in
employment litigation).
159. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Dep’t of Transportation, 2015 WL 4397641 at *5
(E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015) (holding that Commission recognizes sexual orientation
discrimination as subset of sex discrimination under Title VII).
160. See Ben Penn et al., Justice Department Urges Civil Rights Agency to Flip LGBT
Stance, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2019, 5:02 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
daily-labor-report/justice-department-urges-civil-rights-agency-to-flip-lgbt-stance
[https://perma.cc/2VP3-UEE7] (reporting that two of three commissioners cur-
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modeled after Title VII in some cases, EEOC decisions and advisory
guidance could serve as persuasive support for victims of sexual vio-
lence by student-athletes.161
2. Doing the Bare Minimum
The judicial interpretation of Title IX incentivizes institutional
ignorance.162  Rather than punishing the university for what it
should have known, Title IX liability attaches only where the univer-
sity actually knew and consciously disregarded specific warning
signs—a bar that is easily cleared by burying one’s head in the
sand.163  By refusing to look into possible sources of harm to stu-
dents, schools can shield themselves from vicarious liability under
Title IX.164
Further, when institutions have investigated claims and found
students guilty of sexual assault, fewer than a third of those students
have been expelled from the school.165  Many are allowed to return
to play sports.166  Even those student-athletes who are suspended or
expelled after being found responsible for sexual assault are al-
lowed, under current NCAA policy, to transfer to another NCAA
rently on bipartisan commission believe LGBT discrimination is banned by federal
law).
161. For a further discussion of the limited availability of employment law
doctrine to Title IX sexual harassment suits, see infra notes 213–258 and accompa-
nying text.
162. See Meyer, supra note 85, at 387–88 (assessing universities’ roles in main-
taining “indifference” to avoid liability under Title IX).
163. See Tani, supra note 62, at 1861–62 (explaining that cases establishing
actual knowledge standard “arguably incentivized institutions to ‘bury their heads
in the sand’ rather than actively prevent rights violations, lest they accrue the kind
of knowledge that might trigger liability”).
164. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 777 (predicting that, by using
Gebser standard to review institutional handling of peer-to-peer sexual harassment,
Supreme Court would “give schools every incentive to avoid gaining knowledge of
problems” because “a school . . . that remains ignorant of sexual harassment is
never liable”).
165. See MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 2061–62 (noting lack of punishment by
university of student-athletes found guilty of sexual assault).  The nature of Title
IX investigations is such that the only remedy is internal disciplinary action, which
is up to the discretion of the school. See id. (discussing remedies available to stu-
dent victims of sexual assault).  In the case of especially prized players, the school’s
athletic department often intervenes on the behalf of the accused, sourcing char-
acter witnesses and providing legal counsel of a quality not afforded to the victim.
See id. (describing how disparate circumstances between student-athlete perpetra-
tors and traditional student victims can affect access to justice).
166. See Aislinn Toohey, No Means No: Possible Reforms to Remedy the Way Univer-
sities Handle Sexual Assault Allegations in College Athletics, 2 GEO. ENT. & MEDIA ALL.
L. REV. 2, 9 (2018) (citing instances where athletic departments allowed students
to return to play during and after accusations of sexual misconduct).
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school and resume play.167  The NCAA has considered, but never
implemented, rules that would keep student-athletes with records
of domestic and sexual violence off elite college teams, or at least
prevent schools from providing them with scholarship funding.168
As one advocate of sexual violence reform in the NCAA has written:
The NCAA has . . . authority to enact a bylaw requiring all
member institutions to conduct criminal background
checks as a condition of an athlete’s participation in ath-
letics.  This is analogous with its current requirements on
drug testing.  Instead of having universities being reactive
or protective concerning athlete violence, the NCAA can
mandate as a voluntary organization that universities to
take preemptive measures to combat the violence.  Crimi-
nal background checks offer such a preemptive measure
that the NCAA should consider when evaluating its role in
helping decrease athlete violence.  More than anything it
is simply the right thing to do and a bold move to change
a culture that desperately needs it.169
Although the NCAA has agreed to work on improving its sex-
ual violence policy in response to pressure from lawmakers, the or-
ganization has not yet developed a rule prohibiting member
schools from accepting athletes with criminal or civil records of sex-
ual violence.170  A few schools, including Indiana University as well
as the member universities of the Big Sky Conference, have imple-
mented their own policies prohibiting the acceptance of transfer
167. See Kendall Baker, The NCAA’s ‘Predator Pipeline’, AXIOS (Jan. 23, 2020)
https://www.axios.com/ncaa-athletes-sexual-assault-rules-e0d53060-384c-4d76-8fff-
77b05b3702d0.html [https://perma.cc/CAF4-PQ6Z?type=image] (describing
framework that allows predator-athletes to continue to play NCAA sports).
168. See Nancy Armour, NCAA Continues to Drop the Ball by Accepting Athletes
Punished for Sexual Assault, USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2019, 8:06 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/columnist/nancy-armour/2019/04/04/ncaa-fail-
ures-accepting-athletes-punished-for-sexual-assault/3369687002/ [https://
perma.cc/488S-DRTZ] (expressing disappointment in NCAA’s persistent refusal
to implement prohibition on student-athletes with violent records).
169. B. David Ridpath, The Attitude Toward Sexual and Athlete Violence in College
Sports Must Change, FORBES (Sept. 15, 2016, 9:04 PM) https://www.forbes.com/
sites/bdavidridpath/2016/09/15/the-attitude-toward-sexual-and-athlete-violence-
in-college-sports-must-change/#4be44bc35eaf [https://perma.cc/9Y5L-XGD7]
(explaining power NCAA has to decrease incidents of sexual violence committed
by student-athletes).
170. See Dan Murphy, NCAA Board of Governors Seeking to Change Policies on Ath-
letes with a History of Sexual Violence, ESPN (Jan. 22, 2020) https://www.espn.com/
college-sports/story/_/id/28541927/ncaa-board-governors-seeking-change-poli-
cies-athletes-history-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/YFS9-QVF9] (reporting
NCAA’s “commit[ment] to addressing this very important issue”).
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students with records of sexual violence.171 This development ac-
knowledges a reality that many other schools are trying desperately
to avoid: that it is possible to foresee, and prevent, some of the vio-
lent behavior by student-athletes.172  If Indiana has the foresight to
ban students with violent records, surely other major athletics insti-
tutions can take similar preventive measures.173  It is not as if NCAA
Division I schools each exist within a vacuum, unable to take note
of others’ efforts to reform.174
The existence of policies which seek to eliminate dangerous
persons from the student body, on its own, should be enough to
defeat the constructive notice test in schools that choose not to take
such preventive measures.175  The argument that schools cannot
screen students diligently before admitting them falls apart with re-
171. See Armour, supra note 168 (reporting on Big Sky Conference’s Serious
Misconduct Rule, which prevents anyone with history of sexual violence or ex-
ploitation from participating in athletics); see also Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Why Do Col-
leges Recruit Athletes Who Have Committed Sexual Assault, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 18,
2017) https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/05/18/indiana-ban-sexual-as-
sault-offenders-applauded-not-adopted-elsewhere [https://perma.cc/8XTG-
PSLG] (reporting Indiana University’s policy banning athletes with history of sex-
ual assault).  The Indiana rule was based on a similar rule from the Southeastern
Conference (“SEC”), but while the SEC rule applies only to cross-conference trans-
fers, the Indiana policy bars all freshman and transfer students with a record of
sexual violence. See id. (comparing SEC policy with Indiana University policy).
172. See Armour, supra note 168 (outlining existing policies prohibiting stu-
dents with violent records from transferring to new athletic team).  The NCAA and
its member institutions and conferences are aware of the policies at Indiana and in
the Big Sky Conference, but either do not acknowledge these solutions at all or
attempt to defend their non-adoption with claims that such a policy would be too
difficult to implement across state lines, where the definitions and enforcement of
sexual assault crimes vary. See id. The Big Sky Conference was able to overcome
this apparent obstacle despite its member schools’ locations across ten states. See
id. (asserting multi-state nature of conference does not necessarily preclude crea-
tion of workable policy).
173. See Bauer-Wolf, supra note 171 (discussing Indiana’s policy banning
transfers with violent records).  Indiana University’s own conference, the Big 10,
has not implemented a conference-wide ban on sexual assault transfers. See id.
(noting Big 10 does not have “serious misconduct” prohibition on student-athlete
transfers).  Katherine Redmond Brown, founder of the National Coalition Against
Violent Athletes, describes policies such as Indiana’s as a risk management method
for universities, adding that institutions adopting bans on students with violent
records underscore the serious consequences for Title IX violations. See id. (“To
Brown, this sort of policy doesn’t discriminate against athletes but rather is in in-
vestment in risk management for a college or university. She noted that the recidi-
vism rate for sexual assault offenders is high.”).
174. See Brown, supra note 173 (noting known risk of recidivism among sexual
assault offenders).
175. For a further discussion of institutional knowledge, see infra notes
177–180 and accompanying text.
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spect to high-profile athletes.176  In Simpson, the Tenth Circuit sug-
gested that a school can be deemed to have actual knowledge when
it is aware of a trend within the school’s athletic department specifi-
cally, and in the peer culture of certain organizations at large, of
dangerous male behavior.177  In the Simpson case, academic evi-
dence was combined with prior incidents by Colorado football play-
ers, as well as an official policy that encouraged young women to
show recruits a “good time,” to establish the university’s actual
knowledge.178
Were Title IX and its judicial interpretation not controlling,
common law tort liability would likely hold schools accountable in
cases where information was avoided to protect athletes from sexual
assault claims.179  If the test for institutional liability for peer sexual
harassment was based on what the school should have known,
rather than the stringent standard of actual knowledge, universities
176. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 38 (stating that, for public K-12
schools, effective argument against strict liability for peer harassment is schools’
inability to choose which students to admit).  Universities, unlike public school
districts, have the means and legal right to turn away would-be students based on a
variety of factors. See Hunter, supra note 6, at 281 (discussing how institutional
decisions affect admission of student-athletes).  Because prominent athletic depart-
ments actively seek out and vet potential athletes, the defense that they could not
gain knowledge of a potential recruit’s violent tendencies is a weak argument. See
id. (noting depth of research and investigation into student-athletes’ personal lives
during recruitment and asserting, “[g]iven the actions of coaches, athletic direc-
tors, and school officials bringing athletes to campus and student-athletes’ propen-
sity for sexual violence, schools must do more to adequately protect their
students”).
177. See Walker, supra note 40, at 119–20 (“In addition to describing prior
misconduct by CU football players and recruits as a basis for establishing actual
knowledge of hostile environment harassment, the Tenth Circuit also cited several
national studies on the disproportionate role of student-athletes in campus sexual
assault.  This citation raises the possibility that a school could be deemed to have
actual knowledge of the dangerous peer culture in certain male organizations even
without specific information about previous misconduct involving teams or chap-
ters on campus.  CU knew that its football players and recruits were likely to be
involved in a disproportionately high number of sexual assaults based on academic
research that ‘male student athletes [are] more prone to commit sexual assault
than other male students.’  To its credit, CU cited two of these studies in a hand-
book distributed to football players before the 2001 season, which suggests that the
school was aware that male athletes are a high risk group.”).
178. See Walker supra note 40, at 120 (noting that, in combination, these fac-
tors created situation so obviously dangerous “that the school will be deemed to
have actual knowledge of this elevated risk merely by promulgating such a reckless
policy”).
179. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 792 (discussing common law
negligence test).
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and athletic departments would have an incentive to look into re-
cruits’ potential for or history of violence against women.180
Due to the fact that alleged perpetrators are actually fifty per-
cent more likely than alleged victims to file suit against the univer-
sity following a sexual assault disciplinary hearing, some schools
may be hesitant to come down on the side of the victim, even when
the evidence meets or exceeds the preponderance standard re-
quired by Title IX.181  The number and variety of claims available to
accused students makes it difficult for universities to predict and
prevent liability against their claims while enforcing Title IX.182
This may become even more of a factor in schools’ calculus when
deciding whether to investigate a Title IX complaint, as the current
executive administration has issued policy statements advocating
for increased protections for accused students.183  Moreover, the ac-
tual cost of litigating Title IX claims is often negligible to universi-
ties, particularly set against the vast influx of revenue that a
successful sports team can provide.184
180. See id. (suggesting notice-based vicarious liability would incentivize
schools to investigate where they have reason to suspect problems).
181. See Claire Gordon, Study: College Athletes Are More Likely to Gang Rape, AL-
JAZEERA AMERICA (Feb. 26, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/
america-tonight/articles/2015/2/26/united-educators-sexual-assault-study.html
[https://perma.cc/BZ6H-3Q3U] (noting potential post-disciplinary litigation by
accused students has led some schools to avoid finding them responsible in the
first place).  The article notes that these suits actually cost less for universities than
do successful Title IX suits by victims, which trigger costs beyond damages, includ-
ing public relations response, declines in donations, and the costs associated with
implementing the government’s proposed reforms. See id. (“In the harshest
calculus, some schools may consider it cheaper to hurt the alleged victim.  But . . .
that math doesn’t work, at least not anymore.”).
182. See generally Amy R. LaMendola, School’s or School Official’s Liability for Un-
fair Disciplinary Action Against Student Accused of Sexual Harassment or Assault, 34
A.L.R.7th 1 (2017) (addressing numerous allegations made by students accused of
sexual harassment, and their respective success in holding school or officials
liable).
183. See Erica L. Green, New U.S. Sexual Misconduct Rules Bolster Rights of Ac-
cused and Protect Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/29/us/politics/devos-campus-sexual-assault.html  [https://perma.cc/
5NE7-ZAQ3?type=image] (noting disapproval by victims’ rights advocates, who ar-
gue new rule will make it easier for abusers to get away with sexual assault).
184. See Ann Scales, Student Gladiators and Sexual Assault: A New Analysis of Lia-
bility for Injuries Inflicted by College Athletes, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 205, 288 (2009)
(“The damages paid and defense attorneys’ fees expended while dragging plain-
tiffs out past summary judgment and appeal are chicken-feed, meaningless com-
pared to the University’s allegiance to big-time sports.  Moreover, Title IX plaintiffs
cannot, to date, achieve significant injunctive relief against educational institu-
tions, or at least not injunctive relief that will matter over the long run.  Universi-
ties have nothing, really, to fear from Title IX.”).
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3. Coworker Harassment as a Fitting Model
Title IX was modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, but
interpretation of the statute as related to sexual assault allegations
does not follow the same framework as a Title VII sexual harass-
ment or discrimination complaint.185  Title IX jurisprudence re-
fused to view teachers, and therefore did not even consider viewing
students, as agents of the schools they represent.186  As a result,
there is not a built-in avenue of accountability for a university; in
other words, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply.187
While students of course have the option to bring criminal
charges against their abusers, the criminal complaint process can
be traumatizing and does not provide a tangible remedy for the
victim.188  Even in cases where sexual assault victims have success-
fully brought cases against high-profile athletes, the sentences have
been laughably light.189   This leaves civil suit as a preferable alter-
native—or it would, if the affected students had any realistic re-
185. See Synopsis of Purpose of Title IX, Legislative History, and Regulations, JUSTIA
(last updated Apr. 2018), https://www.justia.com/education/docs/title-ix-legal-
manual/synopsis-of-purpose-of-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/7UGQ-NTL6] (discuss-
ing how Title IX was proposed with understanding that education opportunities
are inextricably linked with employment opportunities for women—implying it is
not far off to suggest that laws for equality in both spaces, and how they are imple-
mented, should be analogous).
186. See Mayer, supra note 111, at 924 (explaining that Supreme Court con-
templated in Gebser, but ultimately decided against, imposing standard of respondeat
superior or constructive notice—consistent with Title VII agency principles—in Ti-
tle IX teacher-student harassment cases).
187. See id. at 932 (recognizing how “[t]he Gebser Court divorced an educa-
tional institution’s liability for the acts of its employees from respondeat superior”).
188. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (estab-
lishing monetary remedy for private action finding intentional violation of Title
IX).  Unlike a private Title IX suit against a university, a criminal sexual assault
investigation affords no monetary relief for the victim, even if the accused is found
guilty. Title IX Investigation vs Criminal Investigation, COLO. COAL. AGAINST SEXUAL
ASSAULT, https://www.ccasa.org/current-issues/title-ix-investigation-vs-criminal-in-
vestigation/ [https://perma.cc/A32M-PCK4] (last visited Jan. 23, 2020) (compar-
ing respective benefits and drawbacks of Title IX and criminal investigations for
sexual assault).  Additionally, criminal cases often take years and their records are
made public regardless of the outcome, whereas Title IX suits are resolved within
sixty days and are not public. See id. (outlining Title IX’s due process provisions).
189. See Liam Stack, In Stanford Rape Case, Brock Turner Blamed Drinking and
Promiscuity, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/09/us/
brock-turner-blamed-drinking-and-promiscuity-in-sexual-assault-at-stanford.html
[https://perma.cc/A5CS-2DZT?type=image] (reporting Turner’s mere six-month
jail sentence for sexually assaulting an unconscious woman).  Turner defended his
actions as resulting from “a culture of drinking, peer pressure and sexual promis-
cuity” at Stanford University. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (indicating
excuses used by high profile athletes accused of sexual assault).
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course against the institution that ignored or even encouraged
their attackers’ behavior in the first place.190
4. Employment-Like Relationship Between Colleges and Athletes
For decades, legal scholars have supported employee designa-
tion for student-athletes based on the nature of the university-ath-
lete relationship and the commercial nature of collegiate
athletics.191  Courts have never conclusively settled the issue of stu-
dent-athletes’ employment status.192  In Dawson v. NCAA,193 the
Ninth Circuit was careful neither to ask nor answer whether college
athletes are technically employees of their universities.194
Similarly, a former Villanova University football player pre-
vailed in a preliminary challenge to his minimum wage suit against
the school and the NCAA.195  The district court, noting there is no
amateurism exception to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),
allowed the parties to proceed with discovery to show whether a
scholarship athlete is an employee and therefore owed minimum
190. See Ridpath, supra note 85 (noting lengths universities will go to in “an
almost desperate attempt to protect the athletic brand”).  While victims could sue
their individual attackers, those students are likely judgment-proof—especially ath-
letes who, as established, are not allowed to make money while in school under
current NCAA regulations. See Anderson, supra note 13 (explaining NCAA athletes
currently cannot profit from athlete status while in school).  For further discussion
of student-athletes and compensation, see supra notes 7–16 and accompanying
text.
191. See Davis & Parker, supra note 99, at 108–09 (summarizing arguments of
scholars who argue student-athletes qualify for designation as employees based on
workers’ compensation standards as well as institutions’ control over athletes and
commercial gain from their performance).
192. See Livers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. CV 17-4271, 2018 WL
3609839, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2018) (observing “absence of any controlling law
conclusively precluding the possibility that a student athlete can be covered as an
FLSA employee”).
193. 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019).
194. See generally Thomas Baker, Narrow Decision Favoring NCAA and PAC-12
Fails to Resolve Whether College Athletes are Employees, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2019), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbaker/2019/08/15/narrow-ninth-circuit-decision-
favoring-the-ncaa-and-pac-12-fails-to-resolve-whether-college-athletes-are-employ-
ees/#6645ea46312a [https://perma.cc/EHQ8-RQZN] (discussing college ath-
letes’ possible employment status as to their universities).
195. See Livers, No. CV 17-4271, 2018 WL 3609839, at *5 (holding student-
athlete not necessarily precluded from employment status with respect to Univer-
sity and NCAA); see also Joanne Deschenaux, J.D., Former College Athlete’s Minimum-
Wage Suit Goes Forward, SHRM (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resources
andtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/court-report-football-
player-flsa.aspx [https://perma.cc/9UE3-MJXY] (noting two other federal courts
had dismissed similar minimum wage suits by student-athletes).
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wage.196  The standard to be applied in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania upon the completion of discovery is the economic realities
test, a common law doctrine suggested by the FLSA.197  Given these
recent developments and the history of theoretical comparison be-
tween student-athletes and employees, it follows that Title VII is a
fitting model for cases of sexual assault by players of high-revenue
college sports.198
C. Title VII Model of Vicarious Liability for Student-Athlete
Assault
In many respects, Division 1 athletes in high-revenue sports are
more akin to university employees than they are to other college
students.199   Although courts rarely uphold employee status for stu-
dent-athletes, they do entertain claims and go through the full com-
mon law analysis.200  Some judges assert that athletes, particularly
those whose sports bring in significant profit for the school, may be
able to show an employment-like relationship to their universities
under existing doctrine.201  The law should reflect athletes’ respon-
sibility as de facto campus representatives.202
It is well documented that high profile student-athletes enjoy
an elevated social status as compared to their non-athlete peers.203
Along with that status comes great influence over the attitudes and
196. See Deschenaux, supra  note 195 (describing success of plaintiff in Livers
in defeat—albeit limited—of presumption against employment status).
197. For a further discussion of the economic realities doctrine and its appli-
cability to determining employment status for vicarious liability, see infra notes
214–222 and accompanying text.
198. For a further discussion of using the  Title VII model to determine insti-
tutional liability in certain Title IX cases, see infra notes 199–254 and accompany-
ing text.
199. See Livers, No. CV 17-4271, 2018 WL 3609839, at *4–*5 (allowing plaintiff
to proceed with argument that collegiate athletes and work study participants are
distinct from other student groups based on non-academic nature of these activi-
ties and extent of discretionary control exerted by university administrators).
200. See Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 2016) (recognizing ex-
pansive nature of Supreme Court employee status doctrine but limiting its applica-
tion because of NCAA tradition of amateurism).
201. See id. at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring) (reasoning that student-athletes
in revenue-generating Division I sports such as football and basketball could plau-
sibly show employment-status under economic realities test).
202. See generally Hunter, supra note 6 (discussing athletes’ status and influ-
ence on campus).
203. See id. at 279–80 (linking “rape culture on campus” to student-athletes);
see also Davis & Parker, supra note 99, at 66 (“‘Because star athletes are held in such
high esteem, they frequently find themselves worshiped by their adoring publics.’
A consequence of this adoration is that athletes are afforded a place in society
which, at least historically, has given them and the public the perception that they
are impervious to the standards that dictate the behavior of others.”) (quoting
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behaviors of young men, which is exacerbated by universities’ fer-
vent promotion of athletes in the interest of financial gain.204  As a
result, a decent argument could be made for why student-athletes,
at least those in the most lucrative sports, should be held to some-
thing higher than a typical Title IX student standard, perhaps ap-
proaching something closer to a Title VII supervisor harassment
model.205
While athletes are not in fact the supervisors of their fellow
students, the policy that supports the distinct standard of supervisor
sexual harassment is similarly applicable to high-status student-ath-
letes.206  As some of the most visible representatives of an institu-
tion, student-athletes are more socially powerful than their peers.207
This power dynamic, often backed by an institutional tendency to
support and defend athletes above other students, creates the same
kind of asymmetry that explains a special standard for supervisor
sexual harassment in the workplace.208
Athletes, like supervisors, have more direct supervision from
the institution and more stake in upholding its reputation than do
other members of the student body.209  Athletes, of course, are not
capable of inducing “tangible employment actions” against their
Merrill Melnick, Male Athletes and Sexual Assault, J. PHYSICAL EDUC., RECREATION, &
DANCE 32, 33 (May–June 1992)).
204. See Davis & Parker, supra note 99, at 67 (noting influence athletes have
over peers and general population, and that “this influence could be expected
given the enormous efforts devoted to packaging, exposing, and promoting ath-
letes for commercial purposes”).
205. See id. at 107–110 (discussing unique contractual relationship between
student-athletes and universities that gives rise to potential employee status); see
also id. at 94 (noting Supreme Court precedent that supervisor liability applies
where harasser is agent of school).
206. See Black & Freeman, supra note 55, at 8 (discussing considerations de-
termining employer liability).  The policy behind holding supervisors to a higher
standard of accountability is based in their elevated status and institutional empow-
erment that create an asymmetrical power dynamic between supervisors and their
subordinates. See id. (referring to “misuse of supervisory authority”) (quoting
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 (1998)).
207. See Hunter, supra note 6, at 279 (indicating student-athletes’ “much
higher status . . . within the school’s hierarchy”).
208. See Hunter, supra note 6, at 279 (noting institution’s tendency to defend
athletes at expense of fair and ethical administration of law and policy in sexual
assault proceedings).
209. See The Student-Athlete, Academic Integrity, and Intercollegiate Athletics, AM.
COUNCIL ON EDUC., at 2 (2016), available at https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/
ACE-Academic-Integrity-Athletics.pdf [https://perma.cc/BT8W-7SEX] [hereinaf-
ter “ACE Report”] (“Intercollegiate athletics is a high-reward area for institutions
and students alike, but with those rewards also come potential risks. Without
proper supervision, athletics can be overlooked in institutional risk management
efforts and should be monitored on an ongoing basis.”).
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peers, but their influence and status can encourage retaliatory be-
havior that would be actionable in the workplace under Title VII.210
Members of teams, the athletic departments, and wider campus
communities often contribute to social ostracizing of the accuser in
defense of particularly well-known and liked athletes.211  As a result,
the victim in a student-athlete sexual assault suit has a heavier bur-
den, both inside and outside of the formal proceeding, than a typi-
cal coworker sexual assault complainant.212  Under a Title VII
model of liability, institutions, rather than victims, would have the
burden to show whether enough was done to prevent and remedy
sexual assault.213
1. Determining Whether a Title VII Model is Appropriate: Case-by-Case
Analysis
Courts determine employment status on a case-by-case basis
when deciding whether to award minimum wage, overtime, and
worker’s compensation under the FLSA.214  Courts also assess the
supervisor and coworker standard on a case-by-case basis in Title
VII suits.215   However, courts should take all relevant facts of a stu-
dent-athlete’s relationship to his peers, along with the amount of
210. See Hunter, supra note 6, at 279–80 (suggesting victims hold university
administrators liable for injuries).  Title VII plaintiffs can prevail on claims of retal-
iation where the harasser or employer punishes the victim or deprives her of op-
portunities after her complaint. See Facts About Retaliation, U.S. EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY EMPL. COMM’N, (last visited March 26, 2020) https://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/types/retaliation.cfm [https://perma.cc/E49R-DBZF] (explaining how em-
ployers can be liable for retaliating against employee for complaining about har-
assment).  When a victim of campus sexual assault reports a high-profile athlete,
the response from the campus community and administration can be similarly re-
taliatory. See Hunter, supra note 6, at 279 (stating it is “not uncommon” for school
officials to interfere with sexual harassment investigations in which student-ath-
letes are accused).
211. See Jordan Mondell, College Athletes Shouldn’t Get a Free Pass for Sexual As-
sault, PITT  NEWS  (Jan. 8, 2018),  https://pittnews.com/article/125983/sports/
college-athletes-shouldnt-get-a-free-pass-for-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/
X95W-9STX]   (providing example of alleged rape victim whose complaint was
dismissed but resulted in death threats from peers and football fans, leading her to
drop out).
212. See MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 2096 (“The social norms of credibility,
the social burdens of proof, are stacked against the survivor; so is the legal liability
standard.”).
213. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999) (discuss-
ing differences in proof required under Title IX and Title VII sexual harassment
suits).
214. For a further discussion of employment status determinations under the
FLSA, see infra note 218 and accompanying text.
215. For a further discussion of Title VII supervisor and coworker status, see
supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text.
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control the school exercises over him, into account when determin-
ing whether to analyze a Title IX case using the Title VII model.216
If the student does not have an employment-like relationship with
the school, the school should be able to retain the harder-to-satisfy
standard of deliberate indifference because it is less likely the
school could or should have known of any danger the student
posed.217
To show whether a person is an employee under federal stat-
utes, including the FLSA, courts must assess the totality of the cir-
cumstances, considering the economic reality of the working
relationship.218  There is no standard economic reality test, but
most are multi-factor analyses that emphasize the importance of the
control the would-be employer exerts over the alleged employee.219
The relationship between universities and student-athletes is inher-
ently a relationship based in control.220  The Department of Labor
(“DOL”) has indicated support for the economic realities test to
determine employment status, offering agency guidance in the
form of a recommended six-factor version of the test.221
The DOL agrees with the NCAA that student-athletes are not
employees under a strict application of relevant employment stat-
utes because participation in college athletics is not motivated by an
immediate promise of compensation.222  Still, payment is only one
216. For a further discussion of the factors to be considered in a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether a student has employment-like status, see infra notes
218–224 and accompanying text.
217. For a further discussion of the case-by-case control analysis and its effect
on liability, see infra notes 218–224 and accompanying text.
218. See Colwell, supra note 17, at 906 (expressing variety of methods used by
Federal Courts to determine employment status).
219. See generally Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285 (dis-
cussing examination of economic reality of working relationships); see also Levitin
v. Northwest Cmty. Hosp., 923 F.3d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting other factors
of test beyond scheduling and supervision include nature of skill required for job
and responsibility for costs of supplies, fees, etc.).
220. See Barbara Osbourne & Claire Duffy, Title IX, Sexual Harassment, and
Policies at NCAA Division IA Athletic Departments, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 59, 75
(2005) (“Coaches have a significant amount of control over a student-athlete’s life.
Their schedules, participatory experience, amount of playing time, and whether or
not they will receive or retain a scholarship is largely up to the discretion of a
coach.”).
221. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (July
15, 2015) No. 2015-1, 2015 WL 4449086, at *1 (describing economic realities test
that has developed as alternative to general common law control test).
222. See Colwell, supra note 17, at 910 (noting DOL’s and NCAA’s view that
collegiate athletes are not employees under federal statutes); Field Operations
Handbook, Chapter 10 – FLSA Coverage: Employment Relationship, Statutory Exclusions,
Geographical Limits, at 10b03(e), DEP’T OF LABOR (updated March 31, 2016), availa-
ble at https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/FOH_Ch10.pdf
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of many factors to be considered under common-law agency analy-
sis, the most significant of which is the extent of control a pur-
ported employer is authorized to exert over the purported
employee.223  Without going so far as to designate athletes generally
as employees, a case-by-case analysis would reveal the extent to
which a university’s athletic department determines and monitors
particular athletes’ activities.224
2. Policy Rationale for Stricter Liability
Many institutions are suspected of unfairly shielding their star
athletes from Title IX investigations.225  When a high-profile athlete
is accused, the university is put in the spotlight.226  To avoid this
kind of bad publicity, some institutions’ administrative response to
sexual assault allegations naming student-athlete perpetrators has
been questionable.227  Under a Title VII model, interference by ath-
letic departments in Title IX investigations could foreseeably give
way to proactive anti-discrimination training and risk-averse recruit-
ing practices, providing a more ethical means of achieving universi-
ties’ desired end.228
As of April 2020, the OCR had 302 open investigations of sex-
ual violence discrimination in post-secondary educational institu-
tions.229  An ESPN “Outside the Lines” survey published in
[https://perma.cc/8EWT-5Z7Y] (“interscholastic athletics . . . do not result in an
employer-employee relationship between the student and the school or institu-
tion.”); see also Donald Remy, NCAA Responds to Union Proposal, NCAA (last visited
March 29, 2020) http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-re-
leases/ncaa-responds-union-proposal [https://perma.cc/K823-PQ4Q] (noting
Remy as NCAA Chief Legal Officer and stating “[s]tudent-athletes are not employ-
ees within any definition of the National Labor Relations Act or [FLSA]”).
223. See id. (addressing variety of factors used by courts in employment-status
analyses).
224. See id. (acknowledging employment status for minimum wage and other
purposes is determined through fact-sensitive analysis of individual’s relationship
with would-be employer).
225. See Hunter, supra note 6, at 278 (detailing Baylor University administra-
tors caught attempting to protect players from legal woes).
226. See id. at 279 (citing Jessica Luther, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: College Foot-
ball & the Politics of Rape, 123–26 (Dave Zirin ed., 2016) (“It is understandable why
schools may want to salvage the reputation of their athletes in order to keep their
talents present on the athletic roster—athletic programs are a major source of
pride and revenue for schools.”).
227. See id. (describing universities’ head-in-the-sand response to sexual as-
sault allegations, particularly against profitable athletes).
228. See id. at 280, 295, 305 (noting university athletic departments’ influence
over and knowledge of athletes’ behavior).
229. See Office for Civil Rights, Pending Cases Currently Under Investigation at
Elementary-Secondary and Post-Secondary Schools, DEP’T OF EDUC. https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/open-investigations/
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November 2018 reflected the overall trend that student-athletes are
around three times more likely to be named as respondents in Title
IX sexual assault investigations than are other students.230  The sur-
vey also sheds some light on schools’ perceptions and assumptions
about student-athlete sexual assault.231
Some universities refused to provide any data, particularly re-
lated to records naming athletes as respondents, claiming the study
would be an invasion of student privacy.232  Some refused to re-
spond, deciding that the study was not a worthy use of limited Title
IX office resources.233  Other universities were more forthcom-
ing.234  An administrator at Kansas State University said in response
to the findings, “[i]f we don’t know this, we should know this.”235
University representatives’ reactions to the data—and even their re-
fusal to participate in the study—raise questions about the amount
of knowledge universities already have or could have about the
prevalence of student-athlete sexual violence.236  While sixty-nine
tix.html [https://perma.cc/S9R6-RHUH] (last updated Apr. 3, 2020) (listing all
open Title IX- Sexual Violence investigations at post-secondary level as of Apr. 3,
2020).
230. See Paula Lavigne, OTL: College Athletes Three Times More Likely to be Named
in Title IX Sexual Misconduct Complaints, ESPN (Nov. 2, 2018), https://
www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/25149259/college-athletes-three-s-more-
likely-named-title-ix-sexual-misconduct-complaints [https://perma.cc/774D-
JWCK] (finding, based on data collected from thirty-two Power 5 universities, that
athletes were three times more likely than other students to be accused in Title IX
complaints in recent years).  The survey analyzed data from complaints concern-
ing allegations of various forms of misconduct, including sexual and domestic vio-
lence, sexual coercion and exploitation, stalking, and retaliation.  See id. (finding
6.3 percent, on average, of Title IX complaints in these categories named student-
athlete respondents).
231. See id. (citing Young, supra note 19, at 795) (relying on rape myth that
“women make false allegations of sexual assault to target innocent men”).
232. See id. (reporting that several schools stated violation of privacy as a rea-
son for not releasing data, even though the public records request explicitly al-
lowed responding universities to omit names and identifying information from the
complaints). The University of Virginia tried to charge over $30,000 to pull Title
IX records—not including athlete-specific data, which the university refused to
provide altogether. See id. (illustrating university’s attempt to stall investigative
work).
233. See id. (quoting Virginia Title IX official who said it would not be “the
best use of our extremely limited resources to try to pull this data for a story”).
Around three-quarters of Title IX offices across all divisions who responded to the
survey reported being understaffed. See id.
234. See id. (reporting that Kansas State, even though it did not previously
have specific record of complaints naming athletes, compiled data in response to
survey).
235. Id. (quoting Jeff Morris, Vice President of Communications and Market-
ing at Kansas State).
236. See id. (providing recent data that demonstrates athletes were three times
more likely than other students to be accused in Title IX complaints).  Setting
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percent of responding universities state they expect there would be
no difference between athletes and non-athletes with respect to sex-
ual assault, and eighteen percent expect that student-athletes would
actually be less likely to be named in sexual assault complaints, the
data shows that these predictions, if honest, are based in mistaken
assumptions that could be remedied by looking into universities’
existing data.237
What universities’ Title IX offices do make sure to do, more
often than not, is notify the athletic department when athletes are
accused.238  This practice has long been criticized as providing an
unfair advantage to athlete-respondents, who receive the full sup-
port of their team and university, often including defense counsel
of a caliber unattainable for the alleged victim.239 Another proce-
dure many universities engage in is providing Title IX training to
athletes, although the majority of respondents to the “Outside the
Lines” survey admitted they did not feel their universities’ training
was very effective.240
College athletic recruiters put immense time and effort into
selecting high-school students to invite to play at the collegiate
level.241  Frequently, these recruiters cite character above talent as
the top criteria they look for in potential recruits.242  Presumably,
aside the concern of Title IX resources, it seems unusual that some universities are
unwilling to look into existing data for patterns that could help mitigate campus
sexual assault. See id.
237. See id. (noting that Title IX offices’ expectations and assumptions are out
of line with reality of sexual assault data).
238. See Paula Lavigne, Conference Breakdown: Sexual Misconduct Complaints at
Each Power 5 School, ESPN (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/
_/id/25080028/otl-analysis-tracking-title-ix-complaints-athletes-power-5-schools
[https://perma.cc/PHQ9-XG7Z] (detailing sexual misconduct complaints and
procedures for contending with them in Power 5 schools).  Thirty-four percent of
schools responding said they give no notice to the athletic department, while
nineteen percent said they have a formal policy of providing notice and an addi-
tional thirty-eight percent said they have an informal practice of notifying the ath-
letic department when an athlete is named as a respondent.  See id. (adding
remaining nine percent said question was not applicable).
239. See Hunter, supra note 6, at 287 (showing university athletic department’s
knowledge of claim can lead to disruption in Title IX investigation process).
240. See Lavigne, supra note 238 (stating that forty-one percent of survey re-
sponses said they felt their school’s Title IX training was extremely or very effec-
tive, while fifty-nine percent said their school’s training was somewhat or not
effective).
241. See College Recruiting Process: How Do Colleges Recruit Athletes, NEXT COLLEGE
STUDENT ATHLETE (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) https://www.ncsasports.org/recruit-
ing/how-to-get-recruited/college-recruiting-process [https://perma.cc/3Q3L-
U67R] (listing various steps involved in college athlete recruitment process).
242. See generally John O’Sullivan, Dear Potential Recruit, Your Talent Only Gets
You So Far, CHANGING THE GAME PROJECT (Aug. 10, 2016), https://chang-
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then, the most prominent players on a team will have been well
vetted by the time they step foot on a college playing field.243
If recruiters are taking students’ propensity to harm their fel-
low students into account, it does not show.244  The leaders of
teams are more likely than other team members to commit sexual
assault, according to a study published in March 2019.245  Accord-
ing to the study, athletes are also “more likely than men in the gen-
eral university population to commit alcohol-involved sexual
assault, particularly multiple times.”246
One of the oft-cited reasons universities invest so much time,
effort, and capital into their athletics programs is that it gets the
word out about the institution.247  However, negative press can have
ingthegameproject.com/every-potential-college-recruit-know/ [https://perma.cc/
QB63-G637] (discussing desirable qualities for college athletics recruits) see also
Becky Carlson, An Open Letter to the Athlete We Must Stop Recruiting, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (June 5, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/views/2017/06/
05/open-letter-coach-high-school-athletes-seeking-be-recruited [https://
perma.cc/JGQ9-EJ3E] (explaining character traits that may negatively affect team
culture, hurting high school students’ recruiting chances).
243. See Fred Bastie, Recruiting Column: What are College Coaches Really Looking
For?, USA TODAY (Sept. 14, 2016), https://usatodayhss.com/2016/recruiting-col-
umn-what-are-college-coaches-really-looking-for [https://perma.cc/J8BV-GX7B]
(explaining that college coaches evaluate students’ character, work ethic, “mental
and physical toughness,” academics, and coachability in addition to athletic
ability).
244. See id. (admitting that college coaches do not look as hard at top-rated
recruits to decide to pursue them).  Sources that emphasize the importance of
students’ “character” offer few details as to what an evaluation of that attribute
actually entails, or which particular qualities would disqualify an otherwise impres-
sive recruit. See, e.g., Bastie, supra note 243 (listing “character” as one of top traits
coaches look for in recruits, but not explaining what behaviors constitute good or
bad character).
245. See John D. Foubert et al., Is Campus Rape Primarily a Serial or One-Time
Problem? Evidence from a Multicampus Study, 26 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 296, 306
(2019), (“Athletes are similar to fraternity men in that they are more likely than
men in the general university population to commit alcohol-involved sexual as-
sault, particularly multiple times. By contrast to fraternities, the most dangerous
men on athletic teams tend to be the leaders. Thus, a high-profile athlete may be
at particular risk of committing sexual violence. Anecdotal evidence for this possi-
bility is ample in the news media. The present finding adds quantitative support to
that assertion.”).
246. Id. (finding a correlation between participation in college sports and re-
peat sexual assault perpetration).  The study analyzed the likelihood of repeat
campus sexual assault perpetration, considering the effects fraternity membership,
athletic participation had on the likelihood of student sexual assault. See id. (find-
ing athletic and fraternity participation correlate to risk of sexual violence).  Find-
ings suggest that the majority of rapes by college men where the victim was under
the influence of alcohol were committed by serial perpetrators. See id. (analyzing
risk of sexual violence recidivism among college men in various circumstances).
247. See John U. Bacon, Why Do Colleges Spend Millions On Football, NPR MORN-
ING  EDITION  (Aug.  31,  2016,  5:10  AM),  https://www.npr.org/2016/08/31/
492057117/why-do-colleges-spend-million-to-compete-in-football-our-commenta-
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a more significant impact than positive press on a university’s repu-
tation.248  While winning a national championship is likely to boost
applications for the next academic year, a nationally publicized sex-
ual assault scandal can be counted on to bring a devastating hit to
public goodwill.249  This criticism can be quantified in lost dona-
tions and decreased applications for enrollment.250  It follows that,
if only to reduce the risk of a public relations nightmare and to save
themselves some money, universities’ own best interests lie in
preventing and responding appropriately to student-athlete sexual
assault.251
Many programs and organizations already recognize the im-
portance of better incorporation and enforcement of university be-
havioral policies in their athletic departments.252  These
stakeholders urge higher standards of accountability in athletic de-
partments as a means of managing and preventing the risks associ-
ated with student-athlete participation.253  The current “deliberate
indifference” standard that all but explicitly encourages cover-ups is
tor-asks [https://perma.cc/VKF4-VVLE] (emphasizing attracting public attention
among rationale for universities’ expensive Division I football programs).
248. For a further discussion of the impact of negative publicity on a univer-
sity’s reputation, see infra notes 249, 250 and accompanying text.
249. See Gordon, supra note 181 (recognizing decreases in donations and ap-
plications as indirect consequences of Title IX violation).
250. See Lisa De Bode, Donation Checks Go Unsigned in Protest Over Sexual As-
sault, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (May 2, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/
articles/2014/5/6/alumni-sexual-assaultcampusendowmentharvard-
dartmouth.html [https://perma.cc/5ALJ-8RJ6] (referencing decrease in univer-
sity donations following sexual assault media coverage); see also Michael McDonald
& John Lauerman, Dartmouth Applications Drop After Tumultuous Year of Protests,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 11, 2014, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2014-02-10/dartmouth-freshman-applications-drop-14-prompting-scrutiny
[https://perma.cc/9GFD-3F33] (using Dartmouth University as case study for de-
cline in prospective student applications following sexual assault press).
251. See De Bode, supra note 250 (underlining connection between university
funding and negative press associated with campus sexual assault).
252. See ACE Report, supra note 209, at 4 (“Presidents, provosts, and other
college and university administrators need to communicate values and expecta-
tions to athletic directors, athletic staff, and coaches clearly and frequently.”).  The
ACE Report is the culmination of a Roundtable held on April 22, 2016, comprising
professors, athletic directors, and other administrators from a wide variety of uni-
versities across the nation, as well as other stakeholders. See id. at 11–12 (describ-
ing meeting and listing participants).
253. See id. at 4 (stating best practices for universities include articulating
“bright lines” between acceptable and unacceptable behaviors because “[athletic
departments having] clear expectations and regular reviews of whether programs
are meeting institutional expectations is the best defense against the pressure
outside interests can bring to bear on individuals in a win-at-all-costs approach to
college athletics”).
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thus directly averse to the capitalist goals of major Division I athletic
programs.254
IV. END GAME: CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS
Importing principles from Title VII analysis into Title IX sex-
ual harassment cases would create a more equitable adjudication
process for victims of student-athlete sexual assault by encouraging
stricter adherence to anti-harassment policies, no matter the social
status or revenue potential of the individual accused.255  Rather
than allowing schools to escape liability on the promise that they
will become compliant with Title IX in the future, the law should
provide an affirmative defense for institutions whose anti-discrimi-
nation policies and practices are already sufficient.256  This would
make Title IX jurisprudence consistent with Title VII and would
provide a real incentive, backed with real consequences, for univer-
sities to implement effective preventive policies.257  It would also
mitigate the concern of switching to a model with a higher burden
on schools, easing the transition and making the change practically
insignificant to universities  whose  reporting  and  investigation
practices  already  effectively deter and resolve sexual assault.258
One may argue students should not be held to an employment
liability standard when, at publicly funded educational institutions,
even teachers and administrators are not necessarily held to such a
standard.259  The issues are not mutually exclusive.260  A workable
254. For a further discussion on the “deliberate indifference” standard, see
supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text.
255. See Graham, supra note 121, at 589 (contrasting fairness of Title IX and
Title VII enforcement models).
256. See id. at 596 (noting J. Ginsburg’s recommendation in Gebser dissent in
support of creating affirmative defense similar to that created by Supreme Court
for Title VII defendants).
257. See id. at 596–97 (noting framework more similar to Title VII would “en-
courage schools to institute policies and thoroughly investigate claims of sexual
harassment”).
258. See id. (discussing effects of lower standard of proof for Title IX sexual
harassment).
259. See Mayer, supra note 111 (explaining standards of Title VII and Title IX
sexual assault liability).  While administrators are subject to Title VII supervisor
liability if they assault their employees, the odd reality of Title IX jurisprudence
makes is such that students, if assaulted by the same agents of the university, are
not entitled to the same protections. See id. at 933–35 (arguing teacher-student
harassment should be assessed according to agency principles, incorporating Title
VII jurisprudence into analysis of Title IX sexual harassment suits against
employees).
260. See generally Buchwald, supra note 67 (proposing concurrent but inde-
pendent progress in jurisprudence for sexual harassment in education and
employment).
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reform would allow all school “employees,” including student-ath-
letes, to answer to a standard of Title VII liability.261  In fact, com-
mentators have previously suggested teachers ought to be held to
the even stricter standard of supervisory sexual harassment due to
the nature of their relationships and power dynamics with
students.262
If universities are going to continue to prize their elite athletes
above other students, they need to follow up that power with the
correlative responsibility.263  Society, and the schools themselves,
have already put male college basketball and football players on a
high pedestal.264  It is unnecessary and unfair to protect such ath-
letes’ perch with a barbed wire fence of institutional ignorance and
bare-bones compliance.265  Holding institutions more accountable
for their failures in protecting the vast majority of their students
may encourage them to adopt—and execute—more realistic, effec-
tive policies regarding student-athlete sexual assault.266
Margaret Nolan*
261. See generally Mayer, supra note 111 (suggesting Title VII liability for all
sexual harassment by employees, including assault of students by teachers).
262. See id. (criticizing distinction in liability between principal-teacher and
teacher-student harassment, when both involve supervisory power dynamics).
263. See Meyer, supra note 85 (explaining “star athletes . . . enjoy elevated
status within the masculine status hierarchy” and “athletes bring more resources
(financial and otherwise) into the judicial process and are better able than
nonathletes to escape punishment for their crimes against women”).
264. See id. at 48 (detailing unusual treatment given to some athletes, includ-
ing “special admission, special eating tables, special grades, special tutors,” and
more).  Student-athletes’ special treatment can lead to a sense of entitlement and a
feeling—not always incorrect—that they are not subject to the same rules and
norms as other students. See id. (discussing effect of special treatment on athletes’
attitudes and behavior).
265. See id. at 387–90 (listing several instances of institutional “deliberate in-
difference” policies that led to unjust results for victims of assault by members of
big-name athletic programs).  There is ample evidence that schools and athletic
programs intentionally ignore behaviors by athletes, then assist in delaying or
needlessly interfere with the disciplinary and judicial processes. See id. (suggesting
standard of deliberate indifference, as currently understood and applied by courts,
is too high to meet in most cases even where school is demonstrably at fault).
266. For a further discussion of how institutional liability can encourage vigi-
lance against sexual assault, see supra notes 225–265 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate Class of 2021, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A., College of Charleston, 2017.  Thank you to all the survivors who have
come forward and shared their stories.  This article would not have been possible
without your courage.
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